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Three Essays on Energy Markets 
Sultan A. Alturki 
This dissertation includes three essays investigating topics relevant to the energy markets. The first 
essay employs a new dataset to measure the impact of investor sentiment regarding oil prices on 
the U.S. inflation premium. The empirical analysis relies on Structural Vector Autoregression 
(SVAR) and out-of-sample forecasts. The results indicate that a one standard deviation positive 
shock to overall investor sentiment regarding oil prices results in a significant increase in the U.S. 
inflation premium by approximately 1.2% over the subsequent 10 weeks. Compared to individual 
investor sentiment, institutional investor sentiment regarding oil prices has a larger impact on the 
U.S. inflation premium. Finally, the study finds out-of-sample evidence that the overall investor 
sentiment regarding oil prices has predictive power on the U.S. inflation premium. 
 The second essay uses sequential energy inventory announcements to shed new light on 
the informational efficiency of financial markets. The findings provide clear evidence of 
inefficiency in oil futures and stock markets. This inefficiency can be exploited by sophisticated 
traders. The study further examines the effect of market conditions, such as liquidity and oil 
attention, on the efficient incorporation of information in this setting. It also constructs a predictor 
that can predict inventory surprises and pre-announcement returns in-sample and out-of-sample. 
Finally, it develops a combination forecast that can be used as a proxy for market expectations of 
oil inventory announcements. 
 The third essay examines the impact of oil shocks on sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) 
for the G10 countries and major oil-exporting countries. The results show that oil demand shocks 
have a uniformly negative impact on CDS spreads. In contrast, oil supply shocks increase the 
spreads of the G10 countries, but reduce the spreads of oil-exporting countries. Using quantile 
regressions, the study finds that oil demand shocks affect spreads across the conditional 
distribution, while oil supply shocks mostly influence the upper quantiles of spread changes. 
Furthermore, a two-state Markov-switching modeling confirms a significant non-linearity in the 










I am greatly thankful to my advisor, Professor Alexander Kurov for his support during my studies 
at West Virginia University. In addition, I am grateful to Dr. Eric Olson for his help. I would like to 
especially thank Dr. Ann Marie Hibbert and Dr. Arabinda Basistha for their support and comments.  









TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................... ii 
DEDICATION .......................................................................................................................... iii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ....................................................................................................... iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................................... v 
LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................. vii 
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................... viii 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... ix 
ESSAY 1. OIL SENTIMENT AND THE U.S. INFLATION PREMIUM ........................... 1 
1.1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 1 
1.2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES ............................................................. 4 
1.2.1 Initial Hypotheses ....................................................................................................... 6 
1.3. DATA ............................................................................................................................... 7 
1.4. METHODOLOGY ......................................................................................................... 10 
1.4.1. Empirical Model ...................................................................................................... 10 
1.4.2. Identification From SVAR ....................................................................................... 11 
1.5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION .............................................................. 14 
1.5.1. Impulse Response Functions ................................................................................... 14 
1.5.2. Structural Variance Decomposition ......................................................................... 17 
1.5.3. Forecasting Models .................................................................................................. 18 
1.6. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS .............................................................................................. 19 
1.7. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 21 
ESSAY 2. MARKET INEFFICIENCIES SURROUNDING ENERGY 
ANNOUNCEMENTS.............................................................................................................. 35 
2.1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 35 
2.2. LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................................... 39 
2.3. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND, DATA, AND VARIABLES ............................. 42 
2.4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION ..................................................................................... 45 
2.4.1. Predicting Returns Before the EIA Inventory Announcements ............................... 46 
2.4.2. Predictability of Inventory Surprises ....................................................................... 47 
2.4.3. Market Conditions and Return Predictability .......................................................... 48 
2.4.4. Return Predictability for Energy Stocks .................................................................. 49 
2.4.5. Combination Forecast .............................................................................................. 50 
2.4.6. Economic Significance ............................................................................................ 53 
vi 
 
2.5. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 53 
APPENDIX A: ESSAY 2 ...................................................................................................... 68 
I. Identification-Through-Censoring ............................................................................... 68 
II. Out-of-Sample Forecasting .......................................................................................... 70 
ESSAY 3. THE IMPACT OF OIL SHOCKS ON SOVEREIGN DEFAULT RISK ........ 71 
3.1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 71 
3.2. RELATED LITERATURE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS ..................................... 75 
3.2.1. Sovereign CDS Spreads: Global vs. Domestic Factors ........................................... 75 
3.2.2. Oil as a Global Factor .............................................................................................. 77 
3.3. DATA, VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION AND UNIVARIATE STATISTICS ............ 79 
3.3.1. Sovereign CDS......................................................................................................... 79 
3.3.2. Oil Shocks Data and Variable Construction ............................................................ 80 
3.3.3. Other Variables ........................................................................................................ 82 
3.3.4. Univariate Statistics ................................................................................................. 83 
3.4. METHODOLOGY ......................................................................................................... 84 
3.4.1. Main Regression Model ........................................................................................... 84 
3.4.2. Quantile Regressions ............................................................................................... 85 
3.4.3. Markov Switching .................................................................................................... 86 
3.5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION ..................................................................................... 87 
3.5.1. The Impact of Oil Shocks on Sovereign CDS Spreads ............................................ 87 
3.5.2. Regime Switching Model and Other Tests .............................................................. 89 
3.6. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 91 






LIST OF TABLES 
ESSAY 1 
Table 1: Summary Statistics ...................................................................................................... 23 
Table 2: Correlations ................................................................................................................. 24 
Table 3: Structural Variance Decompositions .......................................................................... 25 
 
ESSAY 2 
Table 1: Summary Statistics ...................................................................................................... 55 
Table 2: In-sample Predictability of Pre-EIA Oil Futures Returns ........................................... 56 
Table 3: Predictability of Oil Inventory Surprises .................................................................... 57 
Table 4: Predictability of Pre-EIA Oil Futures Return under Different Market Conditions..... 58 
Table 5: Predicting Returns of Energy Stocks .......................................................................... 59 
Table 6: Response of Oil Futures Prices to Oil Inventory Announcements ............................. 60 
Table 7: Predicting EIA Announcements using the Bloomberg Consensus and API Actual ... 61 
Table 8: Performance of Trading Strategy based on Predictor ................................................. 62 
 
ESSAY 3 
Appendix A: Essay 3 ................................................................................................................. 93 
Appendix B: Essay 3 ................................................................................................................. 94 
Table 1: Summary Statistics of CDS Spread Changes .............................................................. 95 
Table 2: Correlation Between the Main Variables .................................................................... 97 
Table 3: Pooled and Panel Regressions..................................................................................... 99 
Table 4: Quantile Regression Model of Daily Spread Changes ............................................. 101 
Table 5: Transition Probabilities, Expected Duration and other Indicators ............................ 102 
Table 6: Markov Switching Panel Model ............................................................................... 103 
Table 7: The Effect of Global Economic Conditions on the Relation Between Soverign CDS 
Spreads and Oil Shocks ........................................................................................................... 104 
Table 8: The Effect of Countries’ Oil Dependency on the Relation Between Soverign CDS 




LIST OF FIGURES 
ESSAY 1 
Figure 1: WTI Prices and the 1-Year Breakeven Inflation Rate ............................................... 26 
Figure 2: Oil Sentiment ............................................................................................................. 27 
Figure 3: Real Growth Rate of Baltic Dry Index ...................................................................... 27 
Figure 4: The U.S. Online-Price Inflation Index ....................................................................... 28 
Figure 5: The Accumulative Structural Impulse Responses for the U.S. 1-year BEIR with the 
Overall Oil Sentiment................................................................................................................ 29 
Figure 6: The Accumulative Structural Impulse Responses for the U.S. 1-year BEIR with the 
Institutional Oil Sentiment ........................................................................................................ 30 
Figure 7: The Accumulative Structural Impulse Responses for the U.S. 1-year BEIR with the 
Individual Oil Sentiment ........................................................................................................... 31 
Figure 8: The Out of Sample Forecasting Models of the U.S. 1-year BEIR ............................ 32 
Figure 9: The Accumulative Generalized Impulse Responses for the U.S. 1-year BEIR with the 
Overall Oil Sentiment................................................................................................................ 33 
Figure 10: The Accumulative Generalized Impulse Responses for the U.S. 1-year BEIR with 
the Bond Sentiment ................................................................................................................... 34 
 
ESSAY 2 
Figure 1: Weights Allocated to the API Actual in the Combination Forecast .......................... 63 
Figure 2: Cumulative Average Return of Oil Futures before EIA Oil Announcements ........... 64 
Figure 3: Cumulative Average Return of Oil Futures before API Oil Announcements ........... 65 
Figure 4: Out-of-Sample Predictability of Pre-EIA Oil Futures Returns using Post-API Oil 
Futures Returns ......................................................................................................................... 66 
Figure 5: Out-of-Sample Predictability of Pre-EIA Oil Futures Returns using the Predictor .. 67 
 
ESSAY 3 
Figure 1: Greece Sovereign CDS Spread Level from May 2013 to December 2017 ............. 106 
Figure 2: Sovereign CDS Spread Levels................................................................................. 107 




This dissertation presents three essays investigating topics relevant to the energy markets. 
The first essay examines the impact of investor sentiment regarding oil prices on the U.S. 
inflation premium. Based on the Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) analysis, a 
positive one standard deviation shock to the overall investor sentiment regarding oil prices 
results in a significant increase in the U.S. inflation premium by approximately 1.2% over 
the subsequent 10 weeks. Compared to individual investor sentiment, institutional 
investor sentiment regarding oil prices has a larger impact on the U.S. inflation premium. 
In this paper, we employ a new dataset to measure investor sentiment regarding oil prices. 
Therefore, investor sentiment regarding oil is an important factor that significantly 
influences the U.S. inflation premium. 
The second essay sheds light on market inefficiencies using unique sequential 
energy inventory announcements. The main empirical results provide clear and 
pronounced evidence of market inefficiency in oil futures and stock markets. Additionally, 
market conditions, such as liquidity and oil attention, play an essential role in the efficient 
incorporation of information in this setting. Furthermore, the study constructs a predictor 
that has an in-sample and an out-of-sample predictive power over oil inventory surprises. 
Finally, it develops a combination forecast that could be used to accurately proxy for 
market expectations regarding oil inventory announcements. Hence, the results show that 
asset prices do not instantaneously reflect new public information; which provides 
profitable opportunities to several players in the financial markets. 
The third essay examines the impact of oil shocks on sovereign credit default swaps 
(CDS) for the G10 countries and major oil-exporting countries. The study shows that oil 
demand shocks have a uniformly negative impact on CDS spreads. However, oil supply 
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shocks increase the spreads of the CDS for the G10 countries, but reduce the spreads of 
the major oil-exporting countries. Moreover, using quantile regressions the study finds 
that oil demand shocks significantly affect spreads across the conditional distribution, 
while oil supply shocks mostly influence the upper quantiles. Finally, a two-state Markov-






Essay 1. Oil Sentiment and the U.S. Inflation Premium 
 
“Measures of short-term inflation compensation derived from yields on inflation-indexed Treasury 
securities increased over the inter-meeting period, due in part to sharply higher prices for oil”  
FOMC Minutes, June 24-25, 2008 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Oil plays a vital role in industrial economies. Nine out of ten post-World War II recessions were 
preceded by significant increases in oil prices and oil price volatility (Hamilton, 2008). As noted 
in the above quote from the FOMC minutes, sharp increases in oil prices often increase the 
inflation compensation required by investors. Figure 1 displays the spot price of West Texas 
Intermediate (WTI) on the left-hand axis and the U.S. 1-year breakeven inflation rate (inflation 
premium) on the right-hand axis.  
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
It is clear that there is a close co-movement between oil prices and the U.S. breakeven inflation 
rate for most of the period. We believe that the most likely mechanism through which oil price 
impacts the breakeven inflation rate is the Fisher equation (𝑖𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡 + 𝜋𝑡
𝑒). Put simply, increases in 
oil prices likely increase inflation compensation, which increases interest rates. Changes in interest 
rates have a substantial influence on the valuation of assets. Hence, it is very important to analyze 
factors that impact interest rates. Given the well-established link between investor sentiment and 
equity markets (Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Kumar and Lee, 2006; Tetlock, 2007), our aim in this 
 
* This essay is based on a paper coauthored with Eric Olson. 
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paper is to examine the effect that oil sentiment has on (1) oil future return and (2) the U.S. inflation 
premium. We estimate a simple economic model through which oil sentiment affects both oil 
future return and the U.S. inflation premium. 
 Kilian (2009) argues that variations in oil prices are primarily affected by supply shocks, 
aggregate demand shocks, and the residual of the variation is classified as precautionary demand 
shocks. Precautionary demand arises from fears regarding shortfalls in expected supply relative to 
expected demand; for example, increased demand due to increased geopolitical risk in the Middle 
East would be an example of a precautionary demand shock. To measure oil sentiment, we use a 
weekly survey-based sentiment index collected by the German-based company SENTIX. To the 
best of our knowledge, we are the first to use the SENTIX oil sentiment indices in this context.  As 
can be seen in Figure 2, the oil sentiment index shows substantial relevance to major events that 
impact the oil market, thus, the index seems to mainly reflect concerns regarding future oil supply 
and demand dynamics. Therefore, we believe that our oil sentiment measure captures oil 
precautionary demand. Other researchers use survey-based sentiment indices in a similar way to 
measure individuals’ concerns regarding different economic and financial indicators. For instance, 
several papers use the Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment to measure concerns and 
uncertainty regarding the growth of household spending (Carroll, Fuhrer, and Wilcox, 1994; 
Souleles, 2004; Akhtar et al., 2011).  
[Insert Figure 2 Here]   
 We use the U.S. breakeven inflation rates (BEIR), the difference between the yield of the 
nominal bond and an inflation-linked bond with the same maturity, as a proxy for the inflation 
premium. BEIR is widely and extensively used by central banks, practitioners, as well as 
academics (Beechey, Johannsen, and Levin, 2011; Jochmann, Koop, and Potter, 2009; Garcia and 
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Van Rixtel, 2007). We adopt the framework of Kilian (2009) and classifying unexpected changes 
in oil prices as supply shocks, aggregate demand shocks, and precautionary demand shocks.  
Hamilton and Baumeister (2019) critique Kilian’s (2009) identification assumptions in his 
Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR). Specifically, restrictions in SVAR usually force 
researchers to assume no contemporaneous effect between the variables. Thus, the lower the 
frequency of the data (i.e. annual data) the stronger the “no contemporaneous” identification 
appears. For example, if we were to use quarterly data, the “no contemporaneous” identification 
assumption would assume that a supply shock has no effect on the breakeven inflation rate within 
the quarter. Obviously, that would be a strong assumption that is likely not valid. One needs to 
balance modeling noise in very high frequency data (i.e. tick by tick data) versus identification of 
the structural relationships. We believe using weekly data balances the validity of the “no 
contemporaneous effect” identification assumption with the risk of simply modeling noise in the 
data. We discuss our identification assumption in depth later. 
 To preview our results, we find that a one standard deviation increase in oil sentiment 
increases the inflation premium by 1.2% over the subsequent ten weeks. This increase in the U.S. 
inflation premium controls for aggregate demand and supply shocks. Furthermore, the institutional 
investor oil sentiment has a greater impact on the U.S. inflation premium compared to the impact 
of individual investor oil sentiment on the U.S. inflation premium. Thus, our results support recent 
evidence that institutional investors may be better informed than individual investors (Ben-
Rephael, Da, and Israelsen, 2017; Roger, Edelen, Ince, and Kadlec, 2016; Sias, 2004). The rest of 
the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the literature and states our hypotheses, 
section 1.3 discusses the data, section 1.4 discusses our methodology, section 1.5 presents and 




1.2. Literature Review and Hypotheses  
The impact of sentiment in oil markets is a relatively new area of behavioral finance. Deeney et 
al. (2015) analyze the role of sentiment by constructing an oil sentiment index using principal 
component analysis. Their findings demonstrate the importance of sentiment in explaining oil price 
movements. In addition, Li et al. (2016) show that sentiment Granger causes oil prices. Maslyuk-
Escobedo, Rotaru, and Dokumentov (2016) perform a jump detection technique to identify co-
jumps and correlation between daily energy prices (spot and future) and sentiment indices. Their 
results suggest a “significant influence in crude oil and aggregate sentiment indices on jumps in 
energy commodity prices.” Sayim, Morris, and Rahman (2013) conduct an impulse response 
function test which shows that a one standard deviation increase in the rational and irrational 
investor sentiment results in a significant positive impact on oil industry returns. Finally, Dowling, 
Cummins, and Lucey (2016) show the presence of psychological barriers around $10 price levels 
for both WTI and Brent futures prices for the pre-credit crisis period of 1990-2006, when oil prices 
were traded within low ranges.  
 Many proxies for sentiment have been chosen in the literature to analyze its impact on 
financial and commodity markets. For the equity market, Baker and Wurgler (2006) construct a 
stock market sentiment index with six proxies “the closed-end fund discount, NYSE share 
turnover, the number and average first-day returns on IPOs, the equity share in new issues, and the 
dividend premium.” Using the same proxies, Huang et al. (2014) construct the aligned investor 
sentiment index by implementing a partial least square (PLS), and Berger and Turtle (2015) 
construct a cumulative sentiment index. Other papers use a variety of proxies, such as the level of 
discounts on closed-end funds, the ratio of odd-lot sales to purchases, and net mutual fund 
redemption, buy-sell imbalance, and Wall Street Journal “Abreast of the Market” column, and net 
exchange to equity funds (Neal and Wheatley, 1998; Kumar and Lee, 2006; Tetlock, 2007; Ben-
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Rephael, Kandel, and Wohl, 2012). On the other hand, sentiment in oil markets is measured using 
a variety of methods. Similar to the proxies used in Baker and Wurgler (2006), Deeney et al. (2015) 
measure sentiment in oil market by “the put–call ratio of oil options, the volume of the oil futures 
traded, the historical volatility of the oil price, the ratio of speculative trades to oil demand and the 
implied volatility of a local stock market index, namely the S&P 500 Energy sector for WTI and 
the Euro Stoxx 50 for Brent.” A few other research papers use Thomson Reuters news releases to 
capture oil market sentiment (Li et al., 2016; Maslyuk-Escobedo, Rotaru, and Dokumentov, 2016; 
Sayim, Morris, and Rahman, 2013). 
 In this paper, we use a unique survey-based index, Oil SENTIX. There have been a few 
other research papers that included different SENTIX indices but not the oil indices. Measuring 
individual and institutional sentiment around five stock markets, Schmeling (2007) “shows that in 
the long-horizon regressions, institutions (individuals) persistently have correct (incorrect) 
expectations about the markets”. Further, Corredor, Ferrer, and Santamaria (2014) analyze the spot 
and future stock markets dynamics for the U.S. and a few European countries during different 
levels of investor sentiment. Menkhoff, Schmeling, and Schmidt (2012) examine whether 
experience and professionalism affect the degree of overconfidence among different types of 
investors. On the effect of weather-induced stock market sentiment, Schneider et al. (2014) “show 
that individual long-term sentiment about stock markets is positively impacted by barometric 
pressure.”  
Breakeven inflation rates have been used extensively as a measure of inflation 
compensation. This market-based inflation measure provides a higher frequency measure 
compared to survey-based inflation measures resulting in a more dynamic and in-depth analysis. 
Further, BEIR is attained from profit-maximizing agents; thus, it is a relatively accurate measure 
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of the unobserved inflation expectation (Kajuth and Watzka, 2011). Jochmann, Koop, and Potter 
(2009) use daily breakeven inflation rates to study the relationship between the compensation of 
long-term and short-term inflation. Their results indicate that inflation is neither unmoored nor 
anchored, but it is apparently contained. Beechey et al. (2011) partially use BEIR to demonstrate 
that inflation in the Euro area is more anchored compared to the U.S. Christensen, Lopez, and 
Rudebusch (2010) decompose long-term BEIR into the inflation expectation and the inflation risk 
premium (IRP). Their findings indicate that the average IRP is close to zero. Lumsdaine (2009) 
finds that oil prices and BEIR of the U.S. comove, but the strength of the co-movement is time-
varying. Jiang (2018) documents the significant impact of oil shocks on the 10-year U.S. BEIR. 
However, to our knowledge, none of the previous studies investigate the impact of oil investor 
sentiment on U.S. measures of inflation.  
1.2.1 Initial Hypotheses 
 
Inflation has a relatively strong correlation to oil prices for several reasons. Oil is considered as an 
essential component that directly or indirectly enters into the production equation for almost all 
industries (Cologni and Manera, 2008). Some industries are more sensitive than others are, but 
they are still all influenced to some extent by changes in energy markets. Inflation uncertainty 
increases with volatility in oil prices which in turn has a direct impact on asset pricing and 
investment decisions due to adjusting discount and/or required rates of return (Huizinga, 1993; 
Cologni and Manera, 2008). Hence, bullish sentiment regarding oil will prompt investors to require 
a higher inflation premium to offset the reduction in purchasing power and the increase in risk.  
Hypothesis 1.1: A positive shock to the overall investor sentiment regarding oil has a significant 
impact on the U.S. inflation premium.  
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Hypothesis 1.2: Overall investor sentiment regarding oil has predictive power over the U.S. 
inflation premium. 
Institutional investors are considered to be informed or smart investors as they have the capability 
to process and to uncover asset-specific information more efficiently than individual investors 
(Bharath, Jayaraman, and Nagar, 2013). However, institutional investors are still prone to 
behavioral biases that influence their investment decisions. Roger et al. (2016) show that 
institutions play a causal role with assets’ anomalies and strongly rejects the sophisticated 
institution's hypothesis. Institutions demonstrate herding behavior as they follow each other to 
invest in the same securities (Sias 2004). Additionally, institutional attention plays a more vital 
role in explaining assets’ mispricing than retail attention (Ben-Rephael, Da, and Israelsen, 2017). 
These pieces of evidence lead us to believe that any behavioral bias by institutions may have a 
higher impact on inflation premium than individuals’ biases. 
Hypothesis 2.1: Institutional investor oil sentiment has a larger effect on the U.S. inflation 
premium than individual investor oil sentiment has on the U.S. inflation premium.  
1.3. Data 
Our analysis covers the period between July 18 / 2008 – August 31 / 2019. The sample consists of 
558 weekly observations. The selected time period was based on data availability. In this paper, 
we use a weekly survey-based sentiment index collected by the German-based company SENTIX. 
The data for SENTIX were accessed through Bloomberg. SENTIX has a database consisting of 
more than 5000 individual and institutional investors and reflects overall oil sentiment for the one-
month price outlook. As noted above, the overall oil sentiment index is broken down into 
individual and institutional investors’ indices. Institutional investors are defined as those who 
register online using their firm e-mail address and go through an identity check. Individual 
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investors are those who register with their individual e-mail addresses. Finally, we use bond and 
equity investor sentiment as part of our robustness checks to differentiate between the oil investor 
sentiment and overall market investor sentiment. 
 Participating in the survey is conducted online through the company website 
(www.sentix.de/index.php/en/), and a weekly reminder e-mail is sent to registered members. The 
participation in the survey is not mandatory but participants are rewarded by access to some 
exclusive data analysis as an incentive.  In Oil SENTIX indices, participants are asked about their 
expectations of oil prices in the short-term (one month). There are four answer choices which they 
can select from bullish, bearish, neutral, and no opinion. In this paper, we use the short-term 
Headline Oil SENTIX (SNTXOIH1), which reflects the concerns and beliefs of the survey’s 
participants regarding oil prices after one month. The survey’s participants can take part in the 
survey weekly from Friday – Saturday, Central European Time (SENTIX, 2016). In addition, the 
index is constructed based on the so-called bull-bear-spread, which is used in several previous 
research papers such as (Brown and Cliff, 2004; Brown and Cliff, 2005). The formula is: 





i s i s
t t







 where the subscript t indicates time horizon (short-term), i and s denote individual investors and 
institutional investors, respectively. Figure 2 displays the overall oil sentiment index over the 
2008-2019 time period with the gray highlighted areas denoting key events (i.e. the Arab Spring, 
Iran Sanctions fear, etc.). As we can see, the sentiment index spikes during times of critical events.  
In order to measure oil prices, we use the continuous closest to expiration Brent oil future 
contracts. The oil future prices are appropriately adjusted for contract rollovers. Furthermore, the 
weekly Brent oil futures return has been deflated using the U.S. online-inflation index (MIT’s 
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Billion Price Project). All the Brent oil future contracts prices are provided by Genesis Financial 
Technologies. As noted above, the Breakeven Inflation Rate (BEIR) is the difference between the 
yield of a nominal bond and an inflation-linked bond with the same maturity. This market-based 
inflation measure provides a higher frequency measure compared to survey-based inflation 
measures resulting in a more dynamic and in-depth analysis. In this paper, we choose the 1-year 
U.S. BEIR.1 Table 1 displays the summary statistics for all the data used in our analysis and Table 
2 displays the unconditional correlations. Note in Table 1 that the mean of the 1-year U.S. inflation 
premium is 0.74 and has a 0.16 correlation (Table 2) with the overall investor sentiment regarding 
oil. However, the correlation decreases with longer horizons; for example, the U.S. the 5-year U.S. 
inflation premium has only 0.11 correlation with the oil sentiment measures. 
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 Here]  
 We use the Baltic Dry Index (BDI) as a proxy for worldwide economic activity which 
represents the aggregate demand. It has been shown in numerous research papers that oil prices 
are highly correlated and significantly impact global economic activities (Brown and Yücel, 2002; 
Hamilton, 2009; He, Wang, and Lai, 2010). Shipping accounts for around 80% of internationally 
traded goods and commodities.2 Additionally, freight rates are heavily dependent on oil prices as 
it accounts for approximately 50%-60% of total operating costs (UNCTAD, 2010). Several 
previous studies use a similar measure to capture the global economic activities  (Kilian, 2009; 
Kilian and Park, 2009); however, previous measures have a lower frequency (monthly), whereas 
the BDI is published daily which allows us to aggregate it to a weekly measure. Figure 3 displays 
 
1 We have retrieved the 2, 3,5, and 10 year U.S. breakeven inflation rate to conduct robustness checks. Furthermore, 




the BDI index over our sample period. Furthermore, the BDI measure has been widely used in 
previous academic research (Bakshi, Panayotov, and Skoulakis, 2011; Apergis and Payne, 2013).  
[Insert Figure 3 Here]   
We use the inflation measure developed from the Billion Price Project at MIT.3 The data 
for this index is collected from scrapping prices from websites of large retails stores such as 
Walmart. This index has a high frequency (daily) compared to the traditional monthly Consumer 
Price Index (CPI).4 Further, it covers a substantial number of prices. In the United States, 
approximately a half-million prices are collected daily, whereas the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
collects only eighty thousand prices monthly (Cavallo and Rigobon, 2016). As such, we use it to 
transform our variables into real variables. Moreover, the U.S. online-price inflation index shows 
significant reliability as it co-moves with the U.S. CPI (see figure 4). Finally, we use the Michigan 
Inflation Expectation index, retrieved from Bloomberg, as part of our robustness checks.  
1.4. Methodology 
1.4.1. Empirical Model 
As a preliminary, we conduct unit root tests to examine whether the time series contains a unit 
root. The null hypothesis of the ADF test (𝐻0) is the series contains a unit root. In our data, all the 
variables were stationary with the exception of the 10-year Treasury constant maturity rate; as 
such, we use first differences for the 10-year Treasury. The VAR model estimated included the 
following four weekly endogenous variables: overall oil sentiment, the real growth rate of Baltic 
Dry index, Brent oil future real return, and the U.S. 1-year BEIR. We include two exogenous 
 
3 We are grateful to Prof. Alberto Cavallo and Prof. Roberto Rigobon in the Sloan School of Management at MIT and 
founders of the Billion Prices Project for sharing their private data.  
4 Due to our lack of access to the Billion Prices Project after September 2016, we use the monthly U.S. CPI to transform 
our variables into real variables.   
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variables (the credit spread and the first difference of the 10-year Treasury) to control for 
macroeconomic conditions. The estimated reduced VAR takes the following form:  
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑐0 + ∑ 𝐴𝑗
𝑘
𝐽=1
𝑌𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝐵𝑗
𝑝
𝐽=1
𝑋𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑡                                                                     (1) 
where Yt-j is the vector of the four endogenous variables, Xt-j is a vector of exogenous variables, 
and 𝑡 is the vector of shocks used to estimate the structural VAR. The shocks satisfy the condition 
E( 𝑡 𝑡′) = I, which is, the shocks’ series are uncorrelated white noise. In addition, 𝑐0 is a vector of 
constants, 𝐴𝑗 and 𝐵𝑗 are coefficient matrices. The lag length was selected using the likelihood ratio 
tests.5 As noted above, in order to control for macroeconomic conditions and the state of the 
business cycle, we include the first difference of the ten-year constant maturity U.S. Treasury rate 
and the credit spread, defined as the difference between the Moody’s BAA and AAA bonds. The 
weekly time series of the above variables were downloaded from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis FRED database. 
1.4.2. Identification From SVAR 
In order to obtain structural impulse responses, (1) is rewritten in its moving average 
representation. That is:    
  𝑌𝑡 = B(L) 𝑣𝑡,                                                                 (2) 
where B(L) is (4   4) convergent matrix with B(L) = ∑ 𝐵𝑗 𝐿
𝐽∞
𝑗=0  and 𝐵0 = 𝐼4. 𝑣𝑡 is a vector of (4   
1) of reduced-form residuals assumed to be identically and independently distributed, 𝑣𝑡~ 𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, 
 
5
 The maximum number of lags allowed in a VAR model should be no more than mp + 1 < T where m is the number 




𝛺).  Further, we assume that the reduced-form residuals (𝑣𝑡) have a linear combination with the 
structural shocks ( 𝑡) such that: 
𝑣𝑡 = 𝑆 𝑡                                                                             (3) 
where S is the (4   4) contemporaneous covariance matrix. Thus, we can express (1) as 
𝑌𝑡 = C(L) 𝑡                                                                 (4) 
which implies B(L)S = C(L). In order to uniquely identify S, we must impose additional identifying 
restrictions. Thus, we first order the vector of uncorrelated structural shocks as 𝑡 =
 [ 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡 , 𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑐 , 𝑜𝑖𝑙 , 𝐵𝐸𝐼𝑅] where 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡. is the oil sentiment, 𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑐 is the real growth rate of Baltic 
Dry Index, 𝑜𝑖𝑙  is Brent oil future real return, and 𝐵𝐸𝐼𝑅 is the U.S. 1-year BEIR.  
 We follow the literature in imposing our restrictions and use non-recursive identifying 
restrictions (Sims 1986; Blanchard and Watson, 1986; Bernanke, 1986). Under the non-recursive 
approach, variables could have a contemporaneous effect regardless of their ordering in the VAR. 
For example, oil futures return could have an impact on overall oil sentiment and vice-versa 
regardless of the order in which they entered the VAR system (Kim and Roubini, 2000). On the 
other hand, for a variable to have an impact on other variables, under the recursive approach, this 
variable has to enter first in the VAR system, which is not appealing in our case.  
 The number of restrictions has to be (n × ( n – 1))/2 in order to achieve identification, 
where n is the number of variables (Kim and Roubini, 2000). Since we have four variables, the 
needed number of restrictions is six. To identify the restrictions, we use economic and finance 
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Thus, we assume: 
1- It is assumed that the U.S. BEIR shock does not have a contemporaneous effect on the overall 
oil sentiment, the real growth rate of Baltic Dry Index and oil futures real return, which are 
the three zeros in column 4. 
2-  It is also assumed that oil futures real return shock does not have a contemporaneous effect 
on the real growth rate of the Baltic Dry Index, which is the zero in column 3. 
              Given that the matrix in (5) is two restrictions short, we impose the following long-run 
restrictions. A shock to oil sentiment (overall oil sentiment) has no long-run effect on itself and on 
the real growth rate of the Baltic Dry Index. The restrictions can be imposed by setting the values 
of the infinite number of relevant lag coefficients in equations (3) and (4), ∑ 𝐶11
∞
𝑗  and ∑ 𝐶21
∞
𝑗  
equal to zero (Olivier Jean Blanchard and Quah 1989; Bjørnland and Leitemo 2009). The long-
run restrictions of ∑ 𝐶11
∞
𝑗  and ∑ 𝐶21
∞
𝑗  imply the following linear restrictions: 
𝐵11(1)𝑆11 + 𝐵12(1)𝑆21 +  𝐵13(1)𝑆31  + 𝐵14(1)𝑆41= 0                                (6) 
 
                                  𝐵21(1)𝑆11 + 𝐵22(1)𝑆21 +  𝐵23(1)𝑆31  + 𝐵24(1)𝑆41  = 0                              (7)                
 The restrictions on the fourth column imply that the overall investor sentiment regarding 
oil, the real growth rate of Baltic Dry Index and oil futures real return do not contemporaneously 
respond to a shock in the U.S. 1-year BEIR. These restrictions are similar to the restrictions 
imposed by Kilian (2009) and Kilian and Park (2009). As mentioned before, the literature has 
shown that oil has an impact on inflation, whereas, the impact of inflation on oil has very weak 
evidence in the literature. Moreover, the restrictions in our model are moderated and more 
reasonable as we are using weekly frequency data. Furthermore, the restriction on the third column 
implies that the real growth rate of the Baltic Dry Index, a proxy for aggregate demand shock, does 
not contemporaneously respond to oil futures real return. This restriction is consistent with the 
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literature, which asserts that the response of the aggregate demand shock, which reflects the global 
real economic activity, is sluggish to changes in real oil price/return (Kilian, 2009).  
 The restriction on the first column implies that a shock to investor sentiment regarding oil 
has no long-term effect on itself and on the real growth rate of the Baltic Dry Index, a proxy for 
aggregate demand shock. Oil sentiment as it reflects fears and uncertainty regarding the oil market 
does not have a long-lasting impact on aggregate demand. Aggregate demand is mostly driven by 
strategic planning, so it is expected to dissipate the effect of fears regarding the status of the oil 
market in the long run.6 Furthermore, we assume that the overall oil sentiment to have no long-run 
impact on itself for a couple of reasons. Fears and uncertainty regarding the oil market most likely 
to be mitigated in the long run as events unfold, and investors acquire more relevant information. 
For instance, a shocking geopolitical event may immediately increase fears and uncertainty 
regarding the oil market, but this fear is expected to evaporate as participants of the oil market 
actively acquire more information. 
1.5. Empirical Results and Discussion  
1.5.1. Impulse Response Functions 
Figures 5 - 7 present the cumulative impulse response functions, where column 1 shows the 
response to shocks in the oil sentiment, column 2 shows the responses to shocks in the real rate 
of Dry Baltic (aggregate demand shock), column 3 shows the response to the real return of oil 
futures (supply shock), and column 4 shows the responses to shocks in the U.S. BEIR (inflation 
premium). 
 
6 Several real world examples support this restriction. For example, the recent attack in the Saudi oil company 
(Aramco) in September 2019, and many others.  
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The accumulated impulse response functions (IRF) are plotted in Figure 5 for all the four 
endogenous variables over the ten-week horizon. Note that the results in column 1 are consistent 
with results one would expect from increased fears of possible negative aggregate supply shocks.7 
In column 1 row 2, a positive one standard deviation shock to the overall oil sentiment results in 
a negative contemporaneous effect on changes in the real Baltic index (aggregate demand). Due 
to the relatively fixed amount of global supply in the short term, we believe an increase in oil 
precautionary demand, which is mainly captured by oil sentiment, would result in a decrease in 
the aggregate demand (Peersman and Robays, 2012; Jo, 2014). In addition, a positive shock to 
sentiment increases Brent oil future real return (column 1, row 3) by about 3% in the first week, 
and a significant cumulative return of 2.91% over the next ten weeks.8 Furthermore, a shock to 
the real growth rate of the Baltic Dry index in column 2 results in a significant Brent oil future 
real return of about 1.02% in the first week, and a significant cumulative return of 2.46% over the 
next ten weeks. However, note in the second column that a shock to the Baltic Dry index 
(aggregate demand) does not have any meaningful effect on oil sentiment whereas a shock to the 
futures price of oil has a positive and statistically significant effect on oil sentiment (column 3 
row 1).  
 As noted above, the breakeven inflation rate (BEIR) captures the premium required by 
investors to bear the burden of both expected inflation and inflation risk. Thus, we expect investors 
to require a higher inflation premium if they feel the future price of oil will increase. The impulse 
responses in column 1 of Figure 5 show that a positive one standard deviation shock to the overall 
oil sentiment results in a significant increase in the U.S. 1-year inflation premium of about 0.05% 
 
7 Able, Bernanke, and Croushore (2010) use increases in oil prices during the 1970s as examples of negative aggregate 
supply shocks.  
8 The results are robust and significant when we use oil spot and future prices instead of return. 
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in the first week, and a significant cumulative increase of 1.22% over the next ten weeks. 
Furthermore, column 2 of Figure 5 shows a shock to the real growth rate of the Baltic Dry index 
results in a significant increase on the U.S. 1-year inflation premium of about 0.04% in the first 
week and a significant cumulative increase of 0.23% over the next 5 weeks, and a cumulative 
increase of 0.43% over the next ten weeks. The oil demand shock seems to have a lower and short-
term significant impact on the inflation premium compared to the other shocks. This indicates that 
investors consider increases in oil prices driven by the demand side as good news and a sign of a 
strong economy. Furthermore, evidence shows that the U.S. economy demonstrates resilience to 
oil price increases driven by the demand side (Kilian, 2009). Finally, column 3 of Figure 5 
demonstrates the cumulative 10-week response of the U.S. 1-year inflation premium to the oil 
future real return (supply shock) is approximately equal to 1.08%. These results are highly 
significant given that the mean of the U.S. 1-year inflation premium is 0.74%. 
[Insert Figure 5 Here] 
Overall, our results indicate that the oil sentiment measure is capturing concerns about potential 
disruptions in the oil market that are most likely driven by geopolitical and economic concerns 
given our sample period. 
 Furthermore, the overall oil sentiment measure is decomposed into institutional and 
individual oil sentiment indices and re-estimate the SVAR (see Figures 6 and 7). Our results in 
column 1 of Figures 6 and 7 show that institutional investor oil sentiment has a greater impact on 
the U.S. inflation premium (1-year BEIR) compared to the impact of individual investor oil 
sentiment on the U.S. inflation premium. Column 1 of Figure 6 illustrates that a shock to the 
institutional investor oil sentiment results in a significant cumulative increase of 1.43% in the U.S. 
inflation premium over the next 10 weeks, while column 1 of Figure 7 shows that a shock to the 
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individual investor oil sentiment results in a significant cumulative increase of 1.15% in the U.S. 
inflation premium over the next 10 weeks. While the point estimates certainly appear different, 
given the size of the standard errors, we are not able to definitively argue that the impulse responses 
are statistically different from each other. Again, note also that the results in Figures 6 and 7 are 
consistent with the oil sentiment indices capturing concerns about potential macroeconomic supply 
shocks.  
[Insert Figures 6 and 7 Here] 
1.5.2. Structural Variance Decomposition 
In order to better understand the dynamics of the structural VAR, we also estimate the structural 
variance decomposition. Specifically, we would like to address the question regarding the relative 
importance of each random shock in explaining the fluctuation in the U.S. inflation premium. 
Hence, we compute the forecast error variance decomposition from the estimated structural VAR 
model. This estimation allows allocating the percentage of the forecast error variance to the 
individual shocks. The total percentage of the variance of the error should add up to 100% at a 
given forecast horizon.  
 Table 3 displays the results of the structural variance decompositions at two different 
horizons: 5 weeks and 10 weeks. The column variables explain the amount of variance of the row 
variable. The BEIR rows in each of the two panels are italicized. Note that the oil sentiment index 
explains almost 11.60% of the variation of the BEIR over five weeks, and almost 17% over the 
subsequent 10 weeks. The real returns of oil explain 9.21% of the BEIR variation over five weeks, 
and 13.10% over a ten-week time period. Also, note that the oil sentiment index explains nearly 
half of the variance of the oil returns over both time horizons. Again, these results are consistent 
with the story that oil sentiment is capturing investor concerns about potential supply disruptions.    
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[Insert Table 3 Here]   
1.5.3. Forecasting Models 
Finally, we also develop several forecasting models to examine the out-of-sample predictability of 
the oil sentiment on the inflation premium, measured by the U.S. 1-year BEIR. Welch and Goyal 
(2008) posit that significant in-sample predictive power doesn’t ensure significant out-of-sample 
predictive ability. We follow Welch and Goyal (2008) to develop our benchmark model as a no 
predictability model which is the constant expected U.S. 1-year BEIR model: 
                                  𝐵𝐸𝐼𝑅𝑡 =  𝛽0  + 𝑡.                                                         (8)   
Afterward, we compare our baseline model against four competing predictive regression models:  
                           𝐵𝐸𝐼𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝐵𝐸𝐼𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝑡                                       (9) 
                                         𝐵𝐸𝐼𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑡                                        (10) 
                                                  𝐵𝐸𝐼𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛽 𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑡−1 + 𝑡                                          (11) 
                                                𝐵𝐸𝐼𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛽 𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑡−1 + 𝑡                                     (12) 
To compare our baseline with other competing predictive models, we compute the cumulative 
squared prediction errors for each regression. Subsequently, we construct our lines by computing 
the cumulative squared prediction errors of the NULL minus the cumulative squared prediction 
errors of the ALTERNATIVE. Hence, an increase in a line indicates better performance of the 
ALTERNATIVE model and a decrease in the line indicates better performance of the NULL. Thus, 




 In Figure 8, we find that the overall investor sentiment regarding oil can predict the U.S. 
inflation premium, measured by the 1-year U.S. BEIR. Furthermore, the aggregate demand, 
measured by the real growth rate of the Baltic Dry Index has also significant predictability over 
the inflation premium. However, the real return of oil does not seem to predict the inflation 
premium. We believe this is consistent with the findings of Kilian (2009) in which the supply 
shock of oil has a minimal impact on the macroeconomic aggregates.  
[Insert Figure 8 Here] 
1.6. Robustness Checks 
We conduct several alternative tests to gauge the robustness of our results. First, we estimate the 
generalized impulse response function (IRF) and the generalized historical decomposition (HD) 
(see Figure 9).9 The main objective of estimating the generalized impulse response is to 
demonstrate the results of the same model without imposing any restrictions. All the results are 
consistent with the SVAR results. Columns 1 and 3 of Figure 9, show that a positive one standard 
deviation shock to the overall oil sentiment and the real return of oil futures result in a significant 
cumulative increase in U.S. 1-year inflation premium by approximately 1.25% and 1.70% 
respectively. However, column 2 of Figure 9 demonstrates that a shock to the real growth rate of 
Baltic Dry Index results in an insignificant cumulative increase in the U.S. 1-year BEIR by 0.14%. 
This is consistent with our SVAR results that investors consider increases in oil prices driven by 
the demand side as good news and a sign of a strong economy.  
[Insert Figure 9 Here] 
 Second, we substitute the breakeven inflation rate with an actual measure of the U.S. 
inflation, which is the online-price inflation index. This index is developed out of the Billion Price 
 
9 For the sake of brevity, historical decomposition results and graphs can be provided upon request. 
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Project at MIT. The index was constructed by scraping prices from websites of giant stores such 
as Walmart. We include an actual measure of inflation to validate that sentiment regarding oil has 
an evident and significant impact on an actual measure of inflation. Subsequently, this impact 
should be reflected in inflation premiums measured by BEIR.  The impulse responses show that a 
positive one standard deviation shock to the overall oil sentiment, and the real return of oil futures 
result in a significant cumulative increase on the online-price inflation index by 0.10%, 0.15%, 
respectively. Again, we conclude that the results are consistent with our evidence on the U.S. 
inflation premium.10  
 Additionally, we address the concern that the oil sentiment measure is just a reflection of 
market sentiment or inflation expectation. We use a U.S. bond market sentiment to evaluate the 
impact on the U.S. 1-year inflation premium. The main reason for using a bond market sentiment 
is that the inflation premium measure, BEIR, calculated as the difference between the nominal 
bond yield and the real bond yield. Hence, a bond sentiment measure is more relevant than the 
sentiment for other markets.11 We use the overall SENTIX U.S. bond sentiment index to conduct 
our analysis. This index is constructed exactly the same as the overall oil sentiment which allows 
us to compare the two. The results show that a shock to the overall bond sentiment has an 
insignificant impact on both the real return of oil futures and the U.S. inflation premiums (U.S. 1-
year BEIR) (see Figure 10). Another concern is that oil sentiment is just a reflection of inflation 
expectations. Thus, we repeat our main analysis by adding the Michigan Inflation Expectation 
index as a  control variable. Our results are robust and remain almost the same.12 This contributes 
 
10 The results are based on the following sample period July 2008 – September 2016 as we don’t have access to the 
data before and after this period. For the sake of brevity, results and graphs can be provided upon request of the 
authors. 
11 We conduct an additional robustness check using Sentix U.S. equity market sentiment. The results are very similar 
to those for the bond sentiment showing insignificant impact of equity market sentiment on the U.S. BEIR. The IRf 
graphs can be provided upon request by the authors. 
12 Historical decomposition results and graphs are omitted to save space. 
21 
 
to the evidence that the oil sentiment is mostly driven by the oil market rather than the general 
financial market. 
[Insert Figure 10 Here] 
 We also conduct our analysis with several U.S. BEIRs maturities to further examine the 
impact on the short-term and long-term. We conduct the same analysis on the 2, 3,5 7, and 10 year 
U.S. breakeven inflation rate. Our results are robust among all of the short term time horizons.13 
The short-term U.S. BEIR (2, 3 and 5 year) show a significant impact of the overall oil sentiment 
on the inflation premium.  
1.7. Conclusion 
To our knowledge, this is the first paper that examines the impact of oil sentiment on the U.S. 
inflation premium, measured by the breakeven inflation rate (BEIR). Our main findings 
demonstrate a significant influence of investor sentiment regarding oil prices on the U.S. inflation 
premium. A positive one standard deviation shock to investor sentiment regarding oil prices results 
in a significant cumulative increase of 1.2% for the U.S. inflation premium over the following ten 
weeks. Furthermore, the institutional investor oil sentiment has a greater impact on the U.S. 
inflation premium compared to the impact of individual investor oil sentiment on the U.S. inflation 
premium, although we cannot determine whether the two are statistically different from each other. 
These results are highly significant given that the mean of the U.S. inflation premium is 0.74%. 
Additionally, we find out-of-sample evidence that overall investor sentiment regarding oil along 
with the other oil-related measures to have predictability power over the U.S. inflation premium. 
Our results could potentially benefit policymakers, managers of firms, and investors, among 
others. Monetary policymakers should take investor sentiment regarding oil as a proxy to 
 
13 For the sake of brevity, results and graphs can be provided upon request by the authors. 
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determine investors’ beliefs about potential disruptions in oil markets. In addition, firms may need 
to estimate investor oil sentiment to gauge investors’ risk appetite as it directly impacts their cost 
of capital. Finally, investors and fund managers could refine their investment strategies by 





Table 1: Summary Statistics 
The table includes the variables used in the analysis. These variables are overall oil sentiment, 
individual oil sentiment, institutional oil sentiment, the real rate of Baltic Dry index, real return of t oil 
futures, 5-year U.S. BEIR, 1-year U.S. BEIR, and bond investor sentiment.  All variables are in weekly 
























Mean 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.26 0.74 1.65 -0.06 
Median 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.15 0.94 1.77 -0.06 
Maximum 0.56 0.57 0.54 0.53 19.93 4.50 2.47 0.30 
Minimum -0.44 -0.47 -0.43 -0.35 -29.77 -6.17 -0.78 -0.49 
Std. Dev. 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.10 4.55 1.36 0.50 0.14 
Skewness 0.11 0.12 0.05 0.36 -0.74 -1.84 -2.24 -0.06 
Kurtosis 2.87 2.86 2.91 4.89 7.60 9.22 9.87 2.60 
         




Table 2: Correlations 
The table reports the correlations of the variables used in the study. The variables are overall oil 
sentiment, individual oil sentiment, institutional oil sentiment, the real rate of Baltic Dry index, real 
return of t oil futures, 5-year U.S. BEIR, 1-year U.S. BEIR, bond investor sentiment, U.S. online 



























0.99 1.00       
Institutional Oil 
Sent. 
0.95 0.92 1.00      
Real Rate of 
Dry Baltic 
0.08 0.08 0.06 1.00     
Real Return of 
Oil Futures 
0.56 0.55 0.56 0.10 1.00    
1-year U.S. 
BEIR 
0.16 0.18 0.06 0.06 0.15 1.00   
5-year U.S. 
BEIR 
0.11 0.13 0.03 0.05 0.16 0.81 1.00  









Table 3: Structural Variance Decompositions 
This table presents the Structural Variance Decompositions at the 5-week and 10-week horizons. we 
compute the forecast error variance decomposition from the following estimated structural VAR model 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑐0 + ∑ 𝐴𝑗
𝑘
𝐽=1 𝑌𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝐵𝑗
𝑝
𝐽=1 𝑋𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑡 where 𝑌𝑡 is the vector of the four weekly endogenous 
variables overall oil sentiment, real rate of the Baltic Dry Index, Brent oil future real return, and the 
U.S. 1-year BEIR, Xt is a vector of exogenous variables, and 𝑡 is the vector of shocks used to estimate 
the structural VAR. Our sample covers the period between July 18, 2008 – August 31, 2019.  
 
  
 5 Weeks 
 Oil Sentiment Baltic Dry Index Real Futures Return BEIR 
Oil Sentiment 1.68 0.36 97.21 0.74 
Baltic Dry 
Index 
5.95 92.82 0.99 0.24 
Real Futures 
Return 
51.82 6.24 38.27 3.67 
BEIR 11.57 1.92 9.21 77.30 
 10 Weeks 
 Oil Sentiment Baltic Dry Index Real Futures Return BEIR 
Oil Sentiment 1.70 0.54 96.81 0.95 
Baltic Dry 
Index 
7.60 89.06 2.64 0.68 
Real Futures 
Return 
50.62 7.15 37.88 4.35 
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Figure 2: Oil Sentiment 
                    This figure shows the overall oil sentiment for the period between July 18, 2008 – August 31, 2019. 
 
 
Figure 3: Real Growth Rate of Baltic Dry Index 
This figure real growth rate of the Baltic Dry Index (BDI) for the period between July 18, 2008 
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Figure 4: The U.S. Online-Price Inflation Index 






14 Source: The Billion Prices Project website (http://www.thebillionpricesproject.com/usa/). The graphs were accessed on Aug/2017. 
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Figure 5: The Accumulative Structural Impulse Responses for the U.S. 1-year BEIR with the Overall Oil Sentiment 
This figure shows accumulative structural impulse response functions (IRF) from the following VAR: 𝑌𝑡 = 𝑐0 + ∑ 𝐴𝑗
𝑘
𝐽=1 𝑌𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝐵𝑗
𝑝
𝐽=1 𝑋𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑡 
where 𝑌𝑡 is the vector of the four weekly endogenous variables overall oil sentiment, real rate of the Baltic Dry Index, Brent oil future real return, 
and the U.S. 1-year BEIR, Xt is a vector of exogenous variables, and 𝑡 is the vector of shocks used to estimate the structural VAR. Our sample covers 
the period between July 18, 2008 – August 31, 2019. Time on the horizontal axis is in weeks. 
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Figure 6: The Accumulative Structural Impulse Responses for the U.S. 1-year BEIR with the Institutional Oil Sentiment 
This figure shows accumulative structural impulse response functions (IRF) from the following VAR: 𝑌𝑡 = 𝑐0 + ∑ 𝐴𝑗
𝑘
𝐽=1 𝑌𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝐵𝑗
𝑝
𝐽=1 𝑋𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑡 
where 𝑌𝑡 is the vector of the four weekly endogenous variables institutional oil sentiment, real rate of the Baltic Dry Index, Brent oil future return, 
and the U.S. 1-year BEIR, Xt is a vector of exogenous variables, and 𝑡 is the vector of shocks used to estimate the structural VAR. Our sample 
covers the period between July 18, 2008 – August 31, 2019. Time on the horizontal axis is in weeks. 
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Figure 7: The Accumulative Structural Impulse Responses for the U.S. 1-year BEIR with the Individual Oil Sentiment 
This figure shows accumulative structural impulse response functions (IRF) from the following VAR: 𝑌𝑡 = 𝑐0 + ∑ 𝐴𝑗
𝑘
𝐽=1 𝑌𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝐵𝑗
𝑝
𝐽=1 𝑋𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑡 
where 𝑌𝑡 is the vector of the four weekly endogenous variables overall oil sentiment, real rate of Baltic Dthe ry Index, Brent oil future return, and the 
U.S. 5-year BEIR, Xt is a vector of exogenous variables, and 𝑡 is the vector of shocks used to estimate the structural VAR. Our sample covers the 
period between July 18, 2008 – August 31, 2019. Time on the horizontal axis is in weeks. 
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Figure 8: The Out of Sample Forecasting Models of the U.S. 1-year BEIR 
These figures plot the IS and OOS performance of weekly predictive regressions. Particularly, these are the cumulative squared predictions errors 
of the NULL minus the cumulative squared prediction errors of the ALTERNATIVE. ALTERNATIVE is a model that relies on predictive variables 
noted above each graph. The NULL is a no predictability baseline model which is the constant expected U.S. 1-year BEIR (BEIRt =  β0  + 𝑡  ). 
An increase in a line indicates better performance of the ALTERNATIVE model; a decrease in a line indicates better performance of the NULL. 
The sample period covers the period July 18, 2008 – August 31, 2019. 
 
ALTERNATIVE Model 1 Equation:  𝐵𝐸𝐼𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛽 𝐵𝐸𝐼𝑅𝑡−1 +  ALTERNATIVE Model 2 Equation:  𝐵𝐸𝐼𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛽 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1 +  
  




Figure 9: The Accumulative Generalized Impulse Responses for the U.S. 1-year BEIR with the Overall Oil Sentiment 
This figure shows accumulative generalized impulse response functions (IRF) from the following VAR: 𝑌𝑡 = 𝑐0 + ∑ 𝐴𝑗
𝑘
𝐽=1 𝑌𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝐵𝑗
𝑝
𝐽=1 𝑋𝑡−𝑗 +
𝑡 where 𝑌𝑡 is the vector of the four weekly endogenous variables overall oil sentiment, real rate of the Baltic Dry Index, Brent oil future return, and 
the U.S. 5-year BEIR, Xt is a vector of exogenous variables, and 𝑡 is the vector of shocks used to estimate the structural VAR. Our sample covers 
the period between July 18, 2008 – August 31, 2019. Time on the horizontal axis is in weeks. 
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Figure 10: The Accumulative Generalized Impulse Responses for the U.S. 1-year BEIR with the Bond Sentiment 





𝐽=1 𝑋𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑡 where 𝑌𝑡 is the vector of the four weekly endogenous variables bond sentiment, real rate of Baltic Dry Index, Brent oil future real 
return, and the U.S. 1-year BEIR, Xt is a vector of exogenous variables, and 𝑡 is the vector of shocks used to estimate the structural VAR.  Our 
sample covers the period between July 18, 2008 – August 31, 2019. Time on the horizontal axis is in weeks. 
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Oil inventory announcements move energy markets. These announcements provide essential 
signals regarding the supply and demand of oil. Two of the primary energy announcements, made 
by the American Petroleum Institute (API) and the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), 
occur weekly. These two public announcements provide very similar fundamental information, 
and they are closely followed by traders in financial markets. According to the efficient market 
hypothesis, fundamental public information should be immediately impounded into asset prices. 
The immediate price adjustment prevents traders from exploiting public information to make 
profitable trades (French and Roll, 1986). 
  There is no consensus regarding the efficiency of oil futures markets. While some studies 
have found that oil futures are highly efficient (Tabak and Cajueiro, 2007; Wang and Yang, 2010; 
Kristoufek and Vosvrda, 2014; Kristoufek, 2018), others have found oil prices to be less efficient 
(Shambora and Rossiter, 2007; Alvarez-Ramirez, Alvarez, and Solis, 2010). Several studies find 
evidence of informed trading before energy inventory announcements. Gu and Kurov (2018) show 
that trading prior to the EIA weekly natural gas announcements is driven by informed traders who 
rely on superior forecasting skills. Rousse and Sévi (2019) suggest that information leakage is a 
potential cause of the observed trading pattern prior to the weekly oil inventory announcements 
 
* This essay is based on a paper coauthored with Alexander Kurov.   
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released by the EIA.  
 The API oil inventory announcements are followed 18 hours later by the oil inventory 
announcements from the EIA. We use the unique sequential nature of these events to analyze the 
efficiency of oil futures markets and to explain the evidence of informed trading before the EIA 
oil announcements. We utilize the same setting to contribute to the literature on stock market 
efficiency. In addition, we construct a simple predictor that can be used to predict inventory 
surprises and pre-announcement returns. We ask the following relevant questions: (1) How do 
market conditions influence market efficiency around energy announcements? (2) Can we utilize 
public news about energy to predict inventory surprises and asset prices? (3) Can we construct an 
improved forecast of energy announcements?  
 We find that the oil futures return after the API announcements significantly predicts the 
return before the EIA announcements. This finding provides strong evidence that oil futures do 
not immediately incorporate all of the public information released by the API. Thus, our results 
indicate that the price drift before the EIA oil announcements documented by Rousse and Sévi 
(2019) can be explained by delayed adjustment to public information.  
 Market conditions, such as liquidity and oil attention, can influence market efficiency. 
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2008), examine the role of liquidity in market efficiency. They 
find that the predictability of returns from past order flows decreases when liquidity is high. Akbas, 
Armstrong, Sorescu, and Subrahmanyam (2016) find that financial markets become more efficient 
when investors put more capital in mutual funds that trade on market anomalies. Furthermore, 
higher trading activity of algorithmic and high-frequency traders facilitates liquidity and price 
discovery (Hasbrouck and Saar 2013; Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan 2014). Therefore, high 
liquidity should facilitate the efficient incorporation of information in oil futures prices. Consistent 
37 
 
with this expectation, we find that the oil futures returns after the API oil announcements 
significantly predict the pre-EIA announcement returns only during periods of low liquidity. 
  Additionally, attention is a limited cognitive resource that investors need to allocate to 
information they believe is important (Kahneman, 1973). Thus, public information should be 
efficiently incorporated into prices when investors pay attention to it. Barber and Odean 
(2008)show that investors tend to buy stocks that they pay more attention to. Han, Lv, and Yin 
(2017) find that oil-related SVI forecasts daily and weekly oil prices in both in-sample and out-of-
sample tests. We construct an oil-related Internet search activity measure similar to the one 
described in Han, Lv, and Yin (2017). Our findings indicate that the predictive ability of the post-
API announcement oil futures return for the pre-EIA announcement return is confined to periods 
of low attention to oil.  
 Furthermore, we contribute to the debate regarding whether changes in oil prices can 
predict stock returns. Huang et al. (1996) find that oil futures are not correlated with or linked to 
the stock market, except stocks of oil companies. However, others have found that oil has a 
significant impact on stock markets depending on the type of oil shock (Chiang, Hughen, and Sagi, 
2015; Kilian and Park, 2009; Ready, 2018), the specific sectors of the stock markets (Fan and 
Jahan-Parvar, 2012), and whether the market is international or domestic (Hu and Xiong, 2013). 
We find that the opening prices of oil companies do not fully incorporate oil inventory information 
released after trading hours. The post-API announcement oil futures return is a significant 
predictor of the returns of oil companies on the following day.  
 Previous results suggest the importance of the information released by the API in shaping 
the market expectations for the EIA oil announcements the following day. Most of the literature 
evaluates the impact of EIA announcements by considering one proxy for market expectation; for 
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example, Bloomberg median consensus, as described in Halova, Kurov, and Kucher (2014) and 
Wolfe and Rosenman (2014), Reuters forecast as described in Bu (2014), or the API actual as 
described in Armstrong, Cardella, and Sabah (2017). We construct a predictor based on the 
difference between the API actual and the Bloomberg consensus forecast. The predictor has 
significant explanatory power over the pre-EIA announcement return. In addition, a simple trading 
strategy based on the predictor would generate an annualized Sharpe ratio of 0.67 in the full 
sample, and an annualized Sharpe ratio of 2.1 when the predictor has large values.  
 Finally, we employ the relative importance method to construct a combination forecast of 
the EIA oil announcements by objectively allocating weights to the Bloomberg median consensus 
and API actual (Grömping, 2006; Johnson and Lebreton, 2004; Thomas,  Zhu, Zumbo, and Dutta, 
2017). Using our combination forecast as a proxy for market expectations increases the R2 in the 
regression of oil futures returns on inventory surprises by approximately 130% compared to the 
Bloomberg consensus forecast, and by approximately 17% compared to the API actual. Hence, 
using the combination forecast to compute oil inventory surprises reduces measurement errors that 
could stem from the use of a single stale proxy for market expectations. We show that using the 
combination forecast to compute inventory surprises provides more accurate estimates that are 
closer to those generated by employing the Identification Through Censoring (ITC) technique 
proposed by Rigobon and Sack (2008). The ITC technique is employed to adjust for the bias caused 
by measurement error in announcement surprises.  
 Our study contributes to the literature in several important ways. First, we provide clear 
evidence of market inefficiency in the oil futures market using a unique setting of sequential energy 
announcements. We examine how different market conditions influence this inefficiency. Second, 
we show that a similar inefficiency is also present in the stock market. Specifically, opening prices 
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of energy stocks do not fully incorporate public information released after the market close the day 
before. Third, we show that mere public information can be used to predict inventory surprises and 
oil futures returns before the EIA announcements. This alleviates the concerns about possible 
preannouncement information leakage. Finally, we construct a combination forecast of the EIA oil 
announcements that is more accurate than other commonly used measures of market expectations. 
A similar approach may be useful in creating forecasts of other public announcements. 
2.2. Literature Review  
As mentioned above, the literature has not reached a consensus regarding the efficiency of the oil 
markets. Shambora and Rossiter (2007) employ an artificial neural network to uncover hidden 
trading patterns in the oil futures and show the possibility of superior return using the network.  
Alvarez-Ramirez, Alvarez, and Solis (2010) use detrended fluctuation analysis (DFA) to analyze 
the efficiency of the daily spot price of WTI crude oil. They find that crude oil exhibits some 
deviations from efficiency; however, their results seem to depend on the state of the economy. On 
the other hand, Wang and Liu (2010) find that the behavior of WTI at different measurement 
frequencies is consistent with informational efficiency. These results are consistent with the 
findings of Alvarez-Ramirez, Alvarez, and Rodriguez (2008). Wang and Yang (2010) use intraday 
data for crude oil, heating oil, gasoline, and natural gas futures and test the efficiency of these 
markets using several nonlinear models. They find that the crude oil and gasoline futures markets 
are efficient, but heating oil and natural gas futures show weak-form efficiency only during the 
bull market. Kristoufek and Vosvrda (2014) investigate the market efficiency in 25 commodity 
futures. They find WTI crude oil, heating oil, and coffee to be the most efficient compared to the 
other commodities. Kristoufek (2018) replicated the earlier study by Tabak and Cajueiro (2007) 
with extended data up to June 2017. The results show that the efficiency fluctuates over time for 
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both WTI and Brent crude oil but the oil market has been more efficient recently compared to the 
1990s. Furthermore, WTI oil shows stronger evidence of efficiency compared to Brent oil. 
 The literature is very sparse in regards to trading around energy announcements. Rousse 
and Sévi (2019) investigate informed trading around the EIA oil inventory announcements. They 
find some “suspicious trading” patterns before the announcements as there are significant order 
imbalances on the days of oil inventory surprises. They suggest that “the inventory level released 
by the DOE each Wednesday is known by some market participants who can benefit from their 
insider position to make money with the news.” Our paper differs from theirs in several aspects. 
First, our findings point towards sophisticated trading that is driven by mere public information 
which includes the API announcement in the day before. Second, we investigate sophisticated 
trading around both EIA and API announcements. Our findings indicate that the significant pre-
announcement drift exists only before the EIA release. This provides evidence that some traders 
have superior skills for digesting and processing public information.  
In a related paper, Gu and Kurov (2018) find evidence of informed trading, a drift in the 
right direction, before the Weekly Natural Gas Storage Report. The difference between forecasts 
of analysts with superior historical forecasting ability and the Bloomberg consensus forecast 
predicts inventory surprises and the pre-announcement returns of natural gas futures. Our paper 
differs from Gu and Kurov's (2018) study in several ways. First, we show that the oil futures return 
following the API inventory announcements is a significant predictor of the pre-EIA 
announcement returns. This is a clear violation of the weak-form market efficiency. Second, we 
examine market conditions that influence the return predictability around the release of the Weekly 
Petroleum Status Report. Third, in addition to looking at the efficiency of the oil futures market 
we show evidence of inefficiency in stocks of oil companies. 
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 The literature on the impact of macroeconomic news on asset prices is extensive.15 
However, the literature regarding energy announcements is limited. Miao et al. (2018) show that 
oil inventory announcements shocks have a significant impact on oil futures and options prices.  
Wolfe and Rosenman (2014) study the bidirectional causality of oil and gas inventory 
announcements shocks. They analyze how these shocks are transmitted from one market to the 
other. They find that the impact of gas inventory announcements on oil futures volatility is stronger 
than the effect of oil announcements on gas futures volatility. Both Miao et al. (2018) and Wolfe 
and Rosenman (2014) use the Bloomberg median consensus to proxy for the market expectation 
of the announcements. Bu (2014) uses the Reuters survey to proxy for the market expectations and 
finds that the oil inventory shocks move oil futures prices but have limited influence on volatility. 
Ye and Karali (2016) analyze the impact of both the EIA and API inventory announcements on 
crude oil futures returns and volatility. The EIA announcements shocks are measured relative to 
the API actual, whereas the API shocks measured relative to the Thomson Reuters survey. Their 
results show that both the EIA and API inventory shocks have a significant effect on returns and 
volatility. However, the effect of the API inventory shocks is smaller and shorter-lived compared 
to the effect of the EIA inventory news.  
 Armstrong, Cardella, and Sabah (2017) study the impact of the EIA oil inventory surprises 
on crude oil futures liquidity. They find that these shocks resolve uncertainty and increase 
liquidity. Chang, Daouk, and Wang (2009) investigate the impact of analyst forecast accuracy on 
the oil markets. They find that investors are able to identify good analysts and respond to their 
forecasts. Ederington et al. (2019) analyze the properties of analyst forecasts of oil and natural gas 
inventories. They find that the reaction of the daily price of oil and natural gas futures to the EIA 
 
15 Examples of studies in this area include Andersen et al., (2003), Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2007), 
Baum, Kurov, and Halova (2015), Rigobon and Sack (2004), Scholtus, van Dijk, and Frijns (2014). 
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announcements is influenced by the level of forecast dispersion. Additionally, they find that 
inventory forecasts for natural gas are more accurate compared to those for oil. 
 Halova, Kurov, and Kucher (2014) employ the identification through censoring technique 
to correct for biases in the estimates of the responses of energy futures markets to inventory news. 
They find that the bias in the OLS estimates is quite large. Linn and Zhu (2004) analyze the impact 
of the weekly gas inventory announcements on the volatility of the natural gas futures. They find 
that the announcements cause a significant increase in volatility in the 30-minute interval after the 
release. Other studies examine the impact of OPEC announcements  (Karali and Ramirez, 2014; 
Kutan and Demirer, 2010; Schmidbauer and Rösch, 2012; Spencer and Bredin, 2019). 
  To measure inventory news, it is important to choose an appropriate proxy for market 
expectations. We employ the relative importance method to construct a combination forecast 
which could accurately represent the market expectations. This methodology has been employed 
in different contexts to assess the relative importance of multiple variables (Grömping, 2006; 
Johnson and Lebreton, 2004; Thomas et al., 2017). To the best of our knowledge, the only prior 
study that uses combination forecasts to compute inventory surprises is Anatolyev, Seleznev, and 
Selezneva (2018). Our approach differs from theirs in that we do not impose any assumptions in 
allocating the weights. Furthermore, our approach is easily generalized to incorporate more than 
two forecasts. This approach to measuring market expectations can be used in other contexts such 
as macroeconomic and corporate announcements. 
2.3. Institutional Background, Data, and Variables 
Our empirical analysis centers around two major weekly oil announcements. These two 
announcements provide a unique setting because they contain similar information and are released 
on consecutive days. One of these announcements is released by the EIA. Oil companies and 
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refineries are required to participate in the weekly EIA survey and provide accurate information 
about their oil inventory by the end of each Friday.16 The EIA compiles this information and 
prepares the Weekly Petroleum Status Report. The report is usually released on Wednesdays at 
10:30 am ET. Market participants and policymakers closely follow these releases and use them to 
analyze changes in the oil supply and demand.  
 The American Petroleum Institute (API) was established by Congress and the domestic oil 
and gas industry in 1919. The institute has around 625 corporate members, and it is considered 
one of the largest associations in the oil and gas industry.17 The API releases its oil inventory report 
at 4:30 pm ET every Tuesday. These releases are reported by the traditional news media, social 
media and other media platforms (Armstrong, Cardella, and Sabah 2017). As mentioned above, 
prior research finds that the API oil inventory announcements have significant effects on oil prices 
and volatility (Ye and Karali, 2016). The API and the EIA provide similar information, and both 
are considered highly reliable. Furthermore, both EIA and API collect data from almost the same 
respondents and cover around 90% of the U.S. oil and gas industry. According to API, “API 
collects an exact copy of the data submitted to EIA. Respondents send data to API using the same 
weekly survey forms that EIA uses.”  
 Our sample period spans from January 2011 to August 2019.18 This sample period provides 
sufficient data to conduct our analysis and ensure that our results are not driven by a particular 
market regime. Due to holidays, EIA announcements occasionally take place on Thursdays instead 
of Wednesdays. In such cases, the time interval between the API and the EIA announcements may 
exceed 18 hours. In our main analysis, we exclude those EIA announcements that took place on 
 
16 The EIA information is provided on the EIA’s website at https://www.eia.gov/. 
17 The API information is available on the API’s website at https://www.api.org/. 
18 The sample period is chosen based on availability of the API actual data. 
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Thursdays.19 The resulting sample contains 385 EIA oil inventory announcements. 
We use data for the nearby WTI oil futures contracts, since they are very liquid (Chiang 
and Hughen, 2017). These futures are considered to be very efficient in incorporating public 
information. We use intraday data, which allows us to analyze trading activity and price behavior 
around the EIA and API inventory announcements. We use the oil futures data to construct the 
illiquidity measure following Amihud (2002). This illiquidity measure is defined as follows: 
 





where 𝑟𝑑,𝑠 is the absolute return and 𝑑𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑑,𝑠 is the volume on day 𝑑 in period 𝑠. This measure is 
widely used in the literature (Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka, 2009).20  
 Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011) use the Google Search Volume Index (SVI) and find that 
an increase in SVI can predict stock returns up to two weeks in advance. Oil attention has been 
shown to have significant predictive power for oil prices at both daily and weekly frequencies 
(Han, Lv, and Yin, 2017). We measure attention to oil prices using daily Google SVI data. We use 
the search activity for “oil” as our measure of attention to oil prices. We select the following search 
categories to capture attention to the oil market (1) Business & Industrial, (2) Energy & Utilities, 
(3) Oil & Gas.21 Moreover, we download the consensus forecasts for the EIA announcements from 
Bloomberg. We also download the U.S. oil inventory level from the EIA website.  
We construct the combination forecast according to the weights estimated by the relative 
importance analysis. This method is proposed by Lindeman, Merenda, and Gold (1981), 
henceforth LMG. Figure 1 shows the annual weights allocated to the API actuals computed based 
 
19 Our results remain significant and very similar if these announcements are included in the sample. 
20 The Amihud measure has been shown to have the largest correlation with liquidity benchmarks in commodity 
markets (Marshall, Nguyen, and Visaltanachoti, 2012). 
21 We have used several variations of search categories to ensure the robustness of our attention measure. 
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on relative importance regression using data for the previous year. We can see that the API actual 
receives weights of more than 50% throughout our sample period. Table 1 provides summary 
statistics for the main variables used in the analysis. The table shows that the means of both API 
actual and Bloomberg consensus are below the mean of the EIA actual. In addition, the mean of 
the surprises that are computed based on the combination forecast falls between the means of the 
surprises computed based on Bloomberg consensus and API actual.  
[Insert Table 1 Here]   
2.4. Results and Discussion 
As mentioned above, we use the sequence of two very similar U.S. oil inventory announcements 
to examine the informational efficiency of energy markets. In this section, we discuss our results 
and relate them to the existing literature. Rousse and Sévi (2019) find a significant drift in the 
“correct” direction before the EIA oil inventory announcements. They attribute this drift 
potentially to leaked news. Gu and Kurov (2018) ascribe a similar drift before the EIA natural gas 
inventory announcements to superior forecasting. Consistent with these studies, Figure 2 shows a 
price drift in the oil futures before the EIA oil inventory announcements. Below, we provide 
evidence that processing mere public information explains much of this preannouncement drift. 
Figure 3 shows no evidence of statistically significant drift prior to the API oil inventory 
announcements, which is consistent with the API oil inventory surprises being less predictable 
compared to the EIA inventory news.22 
[Insert Figures 2 and 3 Here] 
 
22 We use the Thomson Reuters survey as a proxy for market expectations for the API announcements because the 
results of this survey are usually released at about 2 pm ET on the announcement days (Ye and Karali, 2016). The 
cumulative average returns are very similar when we use the Bloomberg consensus as a proxy for market expectations.  
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2.4.1. Predicting Returns Before the EIA Inventory Announcements 
We begin by testing whether the information contained in the API inventory announcements is 
efficiently incorporated in oil futures prices. The efficient market hypothesis posits that prices 
reflect all public information. Therefore, earlier returns should not predict subsequent returns. 
Panel A of Table 2 shows that the 30-minute return of oil futures post-API release predicts the 60-
minute return of oil futures prior to the EIA oil inventory announcements.23 We find almost the 
same significant predictability of the oil futures returns in other time intervals before the EIA oil 
inventory announcements such as 30 and 90 minutes before the announcement.24 Figure 4 uses 
Welch and Goyal (2008) methodology to show significant out-of-sample predictive power of the 
post-API oil futures returns over the pre-EIA returns.25 These findings present an apparent 
violation of weak-form market efficiency.26 The information in the API announcements is not fully 
incorporated in the price immediately, perhaps because some traders delay trading on this 
information until right before the EIA announcement.27  
 A plausible explanation for the delayed incorporation of information released by the API 
could be attributed to the unique setting of our study. API oil inventory announcements are known 
to provide reliable estimates of the U.S. oil inventory level. However, the EIA announcements are 
more widely recognized and followed compared to the API announcements. Furthermore, WTI 
crude oil futures have a one-hour trading break starting at 5:00 pm ET, and when trading resumes 
at 6:00 pm the market liquidity is relatively low. These factors may contribute to delayed 
 
23 We choose 30-minute return of oil futures after the API announcement because these announcements are released 
at 4:30 pm ET and WTI oil futures do not trade from 5:00 pm to 6:00 pm ET. 
24 We use the 60-minutes interval before the EIA announcements to conduct our main analysis because it represents a 
midpoint between the other alternatives.  
25 An explanation of the Welch and Goyal (2008) method is provided in the Appendix. 
26 In a weak-form efficient market, past market data cannot be used to forecast future returns.  
27 We find no evidence of significant asymmetry in the predictability of the pre-EIA oil futures return. Specifically, 
the difference between positive post-API oil futures return and negative post-API oil futures return in predicting pre-
EIA oil futures return is not statistically significant.   
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incorporation of information in the API oil inventory announcements.  
 The Bloomberg consensus forecast of oil inventory changes is publicly available before 
the inventory announcements. However, this forecast is almost never updated after the API 
announcements. Since this forecast does not reflect the API oil inventory news, it is not an up-to-
date measure of market expectations at the time of the EIA oil inventory announcements. Hence, 
we construct a simple predictor computed as the difference between the API actual and the 
Bloomberg median consensus. The predictor represents a forecast of the surprise of the EIA oil 
inventory announcements, if one uses the widely followed Bloomberg consensus as a proxy for 
market expectations. Panel B of Table 2 and Figure 5 show that the predictor can predict the oil 
futures returns before the EIA announcements both in-sample and out-of-sample. These results 
provide further evidence of market inefficiencies as the predictor is based on public information.28 
[Insert Table 2 and Figures 4 and 5 Here]    
2.4.2. Predictability of Inventory Surprises 
We further analyze whether the EIA inventory surprises can be predicted using the post-API oil 
futures return and our predictor. Following previous studies (e.g., Halova, Kurov, and Kucher, 
2014), we compute the oil inventory surprises as the difference between the EIA actual and the 
Bloomberg median consensus divided by the level of inventory. Table 3 shows that both the post-
API oil future return and the predictor can predict the oil inventory surprises. Hence, the EIA oil 
inventory surprises are highly predictable by using public information, probably due to the fact 
that the Bloomberg forecasts of the EIA oil inventory changes are rarely updated after the API 
inventory releases. To address the potential autocorrelation in the EIA inventory surprises, we have 
 
28 As part of our robustness checks, we split the sample in two equal sub-samples and repeated the entire analysis of 
Table 2. The results in both subsamples are similar to those reported in the paper.  
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included the lags of the surprises.29 Table 3 shows that this leaves our results essentially unchanged. 
[Insert Table 3 Here]  
2.4.3. Market Conditions and Return Predictability 
Elaborating on our primary findings under different market conditions, Table 4 provides the results 
of our analysis during times with different levels of liquidity and oil attention. Liquidity plays a 
vital role in market efficiency. Green (2004) shows that price discovery surrounding the release of 
public announcements occurs through trading. Therefore, information will be incorporated into 
prices faster when the market is more liquid. Several recent studies show that sophisticated trading, 
such as high-frequency and algorithmic trading, enhances price discovery and liquidity (Brogaard 
et al., 2014; Hasbrouck and Saar, 2013).  Accordingly, we expect that as liquidity increases in the 
market, predictability driven by market inefficiencies decreases. Consistent with this view, in 
Table 4, our results indicate that the predictive power of the post-API oil futures return for the pre-
EIA oil return is significant only when the liquidity in the oil futures market is low.  
 Investor attention influences the efficiency of processing public information. Barber and 
Odean (2008) find that investors are more likely to purchase stocks that catch their attention. 
Vozlyublennaia (2014) and Dimpfl and Jank (2016), show a significant relation between investor 
attention measured by Google SVI and volatility in financial markets. Fink and Johann (2014) 
relate investor attention to different aspects of markets microstructure. They find that trading by 
all types of traders increases during high-attention days. Regression estimates in Table 4 show that 
return predictability before the EIA announcements is statistically significant only during periods 
of low attention. This indicates that the market processes the API inventory news faster when 
 
29 The optimal numbers of lags were determined using the Akaike information criterion.  
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traders pay attention to oil. 30 
[Insert Table 4 Here]  
2.4.4. Return Predictability for Energy Stocks 
We also examine if a similar market inefficiency is present in energy stocks. Oil is a primary 
production input for energy firms. Therefore, changes in oil prices represent important 
fundamental information for energy companies. The regression estimates in Table 5 show that the 
30-minute post-API crude oil futures return can be used to predict the returns of oil companies 
from the CRSP database on the day of the EIA oil inventory announcements.31 This suggests that 
opening prices of energy stocks do not fully incorporate information about oil inventory released 
after the previous stock market close. 
We also use intraday data for the NYSE ARCA Oil and Gas Index to examine how long it 
takes for energy stocks to incorporate information contained in the API oil inventory 
announcements. Table 5 shows that energy stocks incorporate this information within the first ten 
minutes of the stock market opening. This predictability is no longer significant after the first ten 
minutes of trading. Our findings support the view that oil has predictive ability for stock returns. 
In addition, the 30-minute post-EIA oil futures return has no significant predictive power over the 
NYSE ARCA Oil and Gas Index return during the time interval from 11:00 am until the stock 
market close.32 Therefore, energy stocks seem to be efficiently incorporating oil-related 
fundamental information during the trading hours. 
[Insert Table 5 Here]  
 
30 The correlation between the liquidity and oil attention measures in our sample is approximately 0.10. This low 
correlation indicates that these two market conditions are different from each other.  
31 We identify oil companies using the following SIC codes: 1300, 1310-1319, 1320-1329, 1330-1339, 1370-1379, 
1380-1382, 1389, 2900-2912, 2990-2999, 3533, 4612-4613, 5171-5172, 6792. 
32 These results are not tabulated for brevity but are available upon request. 
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2.4.5. Combination Forecast 
We want to explore how the choice of a proxy for market expectations influences the estimated 
impact of the EIA oil inventory surprises on the oil futures returns. Table 6 shows that when using 
the Bloomberg consensus forecast as the market expectations proxy yields an estimated OLS 
response coefficient of -0.24 and an R2 of 9%. In contrast, computing the EIA oil inventory 
surprises as the difference between the EIA and API actual announced values produces an 
estimated market response coefficient of -0.42 and an R2 of 18%.33 This validates the importance 
of using the information released by the API in measuring market expectations prior to the EIA 
announcements. 
As mentioned above, the Bloomberg consensus forecast does not capture changes in market 
expectations after the API inventory announcements. However, this does not rule out the 
possibility that the Bloomberg consensus forecast contains information not captured by the API 
actual. Regression estimates in Table 7 show that both the Bloomberg median forecast and the API 
actual are useful predictors of the weekly EIA inventory change. Therefore, we employ a relative 
importance method to construct a combination forecast of the EIA oil inventory announcements 
by objectively allocating weights to the Bloomberg consensus forecast and the API actual. 
Grömping (2006) provides a discussion of this approach. The LMG method decomposes the R2 of 
a multivariate regression into non-negative contributions of each independent variable. 
Furthermore, the LMG technique overcomes the potential problem that the contribution of each 
regressor depends on the order in which the regressors are added to the model. The LMG method 
achieves this by using simple averaging over all the possible orderings of the regressors. To 
describe the LMG approach, we use the same notations and steps as in Grömping (2006). For a set 
 
33 To compute the surprises, we scale the unexpected inventory changes by the level of inventory as in Halova, Kurov 
and Kucher (2014). 
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S that consist of all regressors in the model, the  R2 can be expressed as: 
 
𝑅2(𝑆) =  




Once we add an additional regressor that is in set M to the previous set S, the additional R2 can 
be computed as follows: 
 𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑅2 (𝑀|𝑆) =  𝑅2 (𝑀 ∪ 𝑆) −  𝑅2(𝑆)                                     (3) 
The number of possible orderings is the permutation of the chosen regressors 𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑝 which are 
denoted by the tuple of indices 𝑟 = (𝑟1, … , 𝑟𝑝). The model is assumed to include multiple 
regressors, 𝑆𝑘 (𝑟), before the regressor 𝑥𝑘. The part of the R
2 allocated to the regressor 𝑥𝑘 can be 
formulated as: 
 𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑅2 ({𝑥𝑘}|𝑆𝑘(𝑟)) =  𝑅
2 ({𝑥𝑘} ∪ 𝑆𝑘(𝑟)) −  𝑅
2(𝑆𝑘(𝑟))                            (4) 
Finally, from equation (3) we can get the LMG metric as follows: 
 LMG (𝑥𝑘) =  
1
𝑝!
 ∑ 𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑅2({𝑥𝑘}|𝑟)𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  (5) 
Table 6 shows that using the combination forecast as a proxy for market expectations 
increases the R2 of the energy announcement impact on oil futures return by approximately 130% 
compared to the Bloomberg median consensus, and by approximately 17% compared to the API 
actual. Hence, using the combination forecast to compute the oil inventory surprises reduces 
measurement errors that could stem from the use of a single proxy for market expectations.34 To 
analyze the effect of such measurement errors of the estimated market response coefficients, we 
conduct an analysis using the Identification Through Censoring (ITC) technique proposed by 
Rigobon and Sack (2008).35 Regressors are often measured with error. It is well known that this 
 
34 We have explored other proxies for market expectations including the Bloomberg top-ranked analyst forecast. We 
used the Bloomberg consensus in weeks with missing top-ranked analyst forecast. The results are almost the same as 
those obtained using the Bloomberg consensus to measure market expectations before the EIA announcements. 
35 A more detailed description of the identification-through-censoring (ITC) technique is provided in the Appendix. 
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measurement error induces a downward bias in the regression coefficients estimated with common 
techniques. The ITC methodology adjusts for such attenuation bias. Measurement errors in oil 
inventory surprises are driven by two factors. First, any proxy for expectations that does not 
incorporate all available information. Second, the EIA surveys do not cover the entire population 
of oil companies.  
 The ITC estimates of the market response coefficients are reported in Table 6. For all three 
measures of market expectations, the ITC estimates are close to -2. These estimates are much larger 
in absolute value than the corresponding OLS and robust regression estimates reported in the same 
table. These estimates are also about twice as large as the ITC estimate of the oil futures market 
response to crude oil inventory news reported in Halova, Kurov, and Kucher (2014). The larger 
ITC coefficient estimates in our study could reflect the rising importance of the U.S. in the energy 
markets. Due to the increased production of shale oil, the U.S. has become one of the largest oil 
producers in the world. Table 6 also shows that when we use the combination forecast as a measure 
of market expectations, the OLS estimate of the market response coefficient is closer to the 
estimates produced by the ITC technique compared to the OLS estimates based on either the 
Bloomberg median consensus or the API actual. Although the estimated proportion of the 
measured inventory surprise due to noise is quite large for all three measures of market 
expectations, it is smaller for the surprise based on the combination forecast compared to the 
surprises based on the other two expectation proxies. These results provide evidence that using the 
combination forecast to compute oil inventory surprises reduces measurement errors that stem 
from the use of a single stale proxy for market expectations. 
[Insert Tables 6 and 7 Here]  
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2.4.6. Economic Significance 
To examine if oil futures return predictability before the EIA oil inventory announcements can be 
used for profitable trading, we propose a simple trading strategy based on our predictor, computed 
as the difference between the API actual announced value of inventory change and the Bloomberg 
consensus forecast. The strategy involves selling (buying) oil futures contracts 60 minutes before 
the EIA announcements and closing the position 1 minute before the EIA announcement if the 
predictor is positive (negative). Table 8 shows that this trading strategy generates an approximate 
annualized Sharpe ratio of 0.67 in the full sample, and an annualized Sharpe ratio of 2.1 when the 
predictor has large values.36 We assume traders would open a futures position 60 minutes before 
the EIA announcements to be consistent with the other analyses in our study. Table 8 shows that 
this trading strategy generates substantial Sharpe ratios if it involves establishing a position 90 or 
120 minutes before the EIA announcements. 
[Insert Table 8 Here]  
2.5. Conclusion 
This paper uses sequential energy announcements to examine how futures and equity markets 
process information. We find that the oil futures return after the weekly inventory releases by the 
American Petroleum Institute (API) predicts the oil futures return before the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) announcements on the following day. This predictability is 
statistically significant during periods of low liquidity and low attention to oil. Additionally, we 
find that the API actual and Bloomberg consensus forecasts are both useful in forecasting the 
change in oil inventory released by the EIA. We construct a predictor computed as the difference 
between the API actual and the Bloomberg median consensus. The predictor has significant 
 
36 The large values of the predictor are those in the top and bottom deciles. 
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explanatory power for oil futures returns before the EIA announcements both in-sample and out-
of-sample. A simple trading strategy using large values of the predictor to generate trading signals 
would generate an annualized Sharpe ratio of 2.1.  
We develop a combination forecast based on the API actual and the Bloomberg median 
consensus to forecast the EIA oil announcements. The combination forecast increases the R2 of the 
regression of oil futures returns on energy surprises by approximately 130% compared to the 
Bloomberg median consensus used in prior studies. Overall, our results show that asset prices do 
not instantaneously reflect new public information even in the case of widely anticipated scheduled 
announcements. Our results are useful for traders. Policymakers tasked with facilitating efficient 
price discovery in energy futures markets may also benefit from our study. For example, our results 
suggest that public announcements are more likely to be incorporated immediately into asset prices 
if they are released during regular trading hours. Furthermore, more media coverage of these 
releases would increase investor attention, which would facilitate quicker incorporation of new 




Table 1: Summary Statistics 
This table reports summary statistics for the main variables used in the analysis. The EIA actual, 
API actual, combination forecast, and Bloomberg median consensus are in thousands of barrels. 
The predictor is computed as the difference between the API Actual and the Bloomberg median 
consensus divided by the level of inventory. The combination forecast is computed as the weighted 
average of the Bloomberg median consensus and the API actual, with the weights computed using 
the relative importance methodology described in Section 4. Post-API Return is the oil futures 
return in the 30 minutes after the API announcement. SurpriseBloomberg is the oil inventory surprise 
computed based on the Bloomberg consensus, SurpriseAPI is the oil inventory surprise computed 
based on the API actual. SurpriseCombination is the oil inventory surprise computed based on the 
combination forecast. The inventory surprises are expressed in percentage and computed as the 
difference between the EIA actual and the corresponding market expectations proxy divided by 
the inventory level. The sample period is from January 2011 to August 2019 and contains 385 
announcements.  
 
Variable N Mean St. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
EIA Actual 385 307.81 4588.46 -12788 14400 
API Actual 385 191.11 4614.72 -12400 14200 
Predictor 385 -0.01 1.02 -3.34 2.86 
Combination Forecast 385 199.38 3703.36 -9560.56 13116.67 
Post-API Return 385 0.003 0.51 -2.36 2.01 
Bloomberg Median Consensus 385 178.74 2256.5 -4261 2240 
SurpriseBloomberg 385 0.025 0.98 -2.80 2.75 
SurpriseAPI 385 0.031 0.76 -1.99 2.06 
SurpriseCombination 385 0.026 0.70 -2.31 1.88 
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Table 2: In-sample Predictability of Pre-EIA Oil Futures Returns 
Panel A reports estimates for the following model: 𝑅𝑡
𝐸𝐼𝐴 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑡−1
𝐴𝑃𝐼 + 𝑡, where 𝑅𝑡
𝐸𝐼𝐴 is the oil 
futures return from 60 min before to 1 min before the EIA announcement and 𝑅𝑡−1
𝐴𝑃𝐼  is the oil 
futures return in the 30 minutes after the API announcement. Panel B reports estimates for the 
following model: 𝑅𝑡
𝐸𝐼𝐴 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑡 + 𝑡, where  𝑃𝑡 is computed as the difference between the API 
Actual and the Bloomberg median consensus divided by the level of inventory. Panel C reports 
the estimates for the following model: 𝑅𝑡
𝐸𝐼𝐴 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑡−1
𝐴𝑃𝐼 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑡 + 𝑡. The sample period is from 
January 2011 to August 2019 and contains 385 announcements. The regressions are estimated 
using (1) OLS with the White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix and (2) Yohai 
(1987) MM weighted least squares procedure robust to outliers. Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A Post-API Return 









R2 0.04 0.02 
Panel B Predictor  









R2 0.02 0.01 
Panel C Post-API Return and Predictor 
 OLS Robust Regression 
















Table 3: Predictability of Oil Inventory Surprises 
Panel A reports the estimates for the following model: 𝑆𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑡−1
𝐴𝑃𝐼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑆𝑡−𝑛
𝐿
𝑛=1 + 𝑡, 
where 𝑆𝑡 is the EIA oil inventory surprise for day t and 𝑅𝑡−1
𝐴𝑃𝐼 is the return of the oil future contracts 
in the 30 minutes after the API announcement. Panel B reports the estimates for the following 
model: 𝑆𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑆𝑡−𝑛
𝐿
𝑛=1 + 𝑡, where 𝑃𝑡 is computed as the difference between the 
API Actual and the Bloomberg median consensus divided by the level of inventory. 𝑆𝑡 is computed 
as the difference between the EIA oil inventory change and Bloomberg median consensus divided 
by the level of inventory. The optimal number of lags was determined using the Akaike 
information criterion. The sample period is from January 2011 to August 2019 and contains 385 
announcements. The regressions are estimated using OLS with the White (1980) 
heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 









R2 0.23 0.24 









R2 0.51 0.51 
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Table 4: Predictability of Pre-EIA Oil Futures Return under Different Market Conditions 
This table reports estimates for the following model: 𝑅𝑡
𝐸𝐼𝐴 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑡−1
𝐴𝑃𝐼 + 𝑡 where 𝑅𝑡
𝐸𝐼𝐴 is the 
oil futures return from 60 min before to 1 min before the EIA announcement, 𝑅𝑡−1
𝐴𝑃𝐼  is the oil 
futures return in the 30 minutes after the API announcement. We split the sample into high and 
low for each of the following market conditions: liquidity and SVI oil attention. High is defined 
as above the median and low is defined as below the median. The sample period is from January 
2011 to August 2019 and contains 385 announcements. The regressions are estimated using OLS 
with the White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix. Standard errors are shown 
in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 Liquidity Oil Attention 
 Low High Low High 




















Table 5: Predicting Returns of Energy Stocks 
The first column reports estimates for the following model: 𝑅𝑡
𝐶𝑅𝑆𝑃 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑡−1
𝐴𝑃𝐼 + 𝑡, where 𝑅𝑡
𝐶𝑅𝑆𝑃 is 
the full day return of all oil companies in the CRSP database on the days of the EIA announcements and 
𝑅𝑡−1
𝐴𝑃𝐼  is the oil futures return in the 30 minutes after the API announcement. The second and third columns 
report estimates for the following model: 𝑅𝑡
𝑁𝑌𝑆𝐸 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑡−1
𝐴𝑃𝐼 + 𝑡, where 𝑅𝑡
𝑁𝑌𝑆𝐸  is the return of the 
NYSE ARCA Oil and Gas Index on the days of the EIA announcements in the specified time window. 
The sample period for the estimation in the first column is from January 2011 to December 2018 and 
contains 354 announcements. The sample period for the estimations in columns 2 and 3 is from January 
2011 to August 2019 and contains 385 announcements.  The regressions are estimated using OLS with 
the White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix. Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
 CRSP Oil Companies NYSE ARCA Oil and Gas Index 















R2 0.01 0.026 0.003  
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Table 6: Response of Oil Futures Prices to Oil Inventory Announcements 
This table reports estimates for the following model: 𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑡 + 𝑡, where 𝑅𝑡  is the oil 
futures return from 5 minutes before to 10 minutes after the EIA announcement and 𝑆𝑡 is the oil 
inventory surprise. The inventory surprise is computed as the difference between the EIA actual 
and a market expectation proxy, divided by the inventory level. The Bloomberg consensus 
forecast, the API actual, and the combination forecast are used to proxy for market expectations in 
columns (1), (2), and (3), respectively. The combination forecast is computed using the relative 
importance method proposed by Lindeman, Merenda, and Gold (1981). The inventory surprises 
are expressed in percentage terms. The regressions are estimated using (1) OLS with the White 
(1980) heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix and (2) Yohai (1987) MM weighted least 
squares procedure robust to outliers and (3) the identification-through-censoring (ITC) technique 
proposed by Rigobon and Sack (2008). The sample period is from January 2011 to August 2019 
and contains 385 announcements. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
















𝑅2 0.09 0.18 0.21 
 Robust Regression 






𝑅2 0.06 0.08 0.11 







Pseudo-𝑅2 0.97 0.95 0.94 
Proportion of measured 
surprise due to noise 
88% 78% 74% 
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Table 7: Predicting the EIA Announcements using the Bloomberg Consensus and API Actual 
This table reports estimates for the following model 𝐸𝐼𝐴 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝐶 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑃 + 𝑡,  
where EIA actual is the weekly released EIA oil inventory change, BC is the Bloomberg median 
consensus, and AP is the API actual. The regressions are estimated using (1) OLS with the White 
(1980) heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix and (2) Yohai (1987) MM weighted least 
squares procedure robust to outliers. The sample period is from January 2011 to August 2019 and 
contains 385 announcements. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 OLS Robust Regression 














𝑅2 0.65 0.50 
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Table 8: Performance of Trading Strategy based on Predictor 
This table reports the annualized Sharpe ratio of the following trading strategy: selling (buying) 
oil futures contracts 60 or 90 or 120 minutes before the EIA announcements and closing the 
position 1 minute before the EIA announcement if the predictor is positive (negative). The 
predictor is computed as the API Actual minus the Bloomberg median consensus divided by the 
level of inventory. The large values of the predictor are defined as the upper and lower deciles. 
The Sharpe ratio is computed by dividing the sample mean return by the sample standard deviation. 
The annualized Sharpe ratio is computed based on per-event Sharpe ratio times the square root of 
the average number of events per year. The sample period is from January 2011 to August 2019 
and contains 385 announcements.  
 
Window Full Sample (N=385) Large Values (N=77) 
(-60 min, -1 min) 0.67 2.1 
(-90 min, -1 min) 0.62 1.05 




Figure 1: Weights Allocated to the API Actual in the Combination Forecast 
This figure shows the weights allocated to API actuals in constructing the combination forecast 
based on the relative importance method proposed by Lindeman, Merenda, and Gold (1981) and 
estimated separately for each year. The remaining weight in the combination forecast is allocated 
to the Bloomberg consensus forecast. The period is from January 2011 to August 2019 and 
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Figure 2: Cumulative Average Return of Oil Futures before EIA Oil Announcements 
This figure shows the cumulative average return (CAR) of the nearby oil futures contract around 
the releases of the weekly Oil Storage Report. In order to aggregate CARs for positive and negative 
surprises, we invert the sign of returns for positive surprises as in Bernile, Hu, and Tang (2016).  
The inventory surprise is computed as the difference between the EIA actual and the Bloomberg 
median consensus, divided by the inventory level. Only observations with inventory surprises in 
the top and bottom deciles are used. The sample period is from January 2011 to August 2019 and 
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Figure 3: Cumulative Average Return of Oil Futures before API Oil Announcements 
This figure shows the cumulative average return (CAR) of the nearby oil futures contract around 
the releases of the weekly American Petroleum Institute (API). In order to aggregate CARs for 
positive and negative surprises, we invert the sign of returns for positive surprises as in Bernile, 
Hu, and Tang (2016). The inventory surprise is computed as the difference between the API actual 
and the Thomson Reuters survey, divided by the inventory level. Only observations with inventory 
surprises in the top and bottom deciles are used. The sample period is from January 2011 to August 
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Figure 4: Out-of-Sample Predictability of Pre-EIA Oil Futures Returns using Post-API Oil 
Futures Returns 
This figure plots out-of-sample (OOS) performance of a weekly predictive regression using the 
methodology proposed by (Welch and Goyal 2008b). Particularly, these are the cumulative 
squared predictions errors of the NULL minus the cumulative squared prediction errors of the 
alternative. The alternative model is 𝑅𝑡
𝐸𝐼𝐴 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑡−1
𝐴𝑃𝐼 + 𝑡, where 𝑅𝑡
𝐸𝐼𝐴 is the oil futures return 
from 60 minutes before to 1 minute before the EIA announcement, 𝑅𝑡−1
𝐴𝑃𝐼  is the oil futures return 
in the 30 minutes after the API announcement. The sample period is from January 2010 to August 
2019 and contains 385 announcements. The NULL uses the recursively estimated mean of the pre-
EIA oil futures return. An increasing line indicates better performance of the alternative model. A 
decreasing line indicates better performance of the NULL. The blue band represents the equivalent 







Figure 5: Out-of-Sample Predictability of Pre-EIA Oil Futures Returns using the Predictor 
This figure plots out-of-sample (OOS) performance of a weekly predictive regression using the 
methodology proposed by (Welch and Goyal 2008b). Particularly, these are the cumulative 
squared predictions errors of the NULL minus the cumulative squared prediction errors of the 
alternative. The alternative model is 𝑅𝑡
𝐸𝐼𝐴 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑡 + 𝑡, where 𝑅𝑡
𝐸𝐼𝐴 is the oil futures return 
from 60 minutes before to 1 minute before the EIA announcement, and 𝑃𝑡 is computed as the 
difference between the API Actual and the Bloomberg median consensus divided by the level of 
inventory. The sample period is from January 2010 to August 2019 and contains 385 
announcements. The NULL uses the recursively estimated mean of the pre-EIA oil futures return. 
An increasing line indicates better performance of the alternative model. A decreasing line 
indicates better performance of the NULL. The blue band represents the equivalent of a 95% 







Appendix A: Essay 2 
I. Identification-Through-Censoring 
In a part of our analysis, we use the identification-through-censoring (ITC) technique proposed by 
Rigobon and Sack (2008). The ITC technique is employed to adjust for the bias that stems from 
measurement error in the inventory surprises. The measurement error could be due to two reasons. 
First, our measures of market expectations are imperfect, as they do not incorporate all relevant 
information available at the time of the announcement. Second, the actual released value of the 
inventory change is not precise, since it does not cover the entire population of oil companies.37 
We use several proxies for market expectations, which helps to shed some light on the sources of 
measurement error in the inventory surprises. The effect of inventory news on oil futures can be 
estimated using the following simple regression model:38 
 𝑅𝑡 =  𝛾𝑧𝑡 + 𝑡 
           𝑧𝑡 = ∆𝐼𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡−𝜏[∆𝐼𝑡] 
(A.1) 
where 𝑅𝑡 is the oil futures return computed in the specific intraday window around the 
announcement, 𝑧𝑡 is the inventory surprise calculated as the difference between the actual change 
of inventory level, ∆𝐼𝑡, and the proxy for the market expectations of that inventory change, 
𝐸𝑡−𝜏[∆𝐼𝑡]. As mentioned above, 𝑧𝑡 is measured with error. Therefore, it can be represented as: 
 𝑧𝑡 =  𝑧𝑡
∗ +  𝛿𝑡, (A.2) 
where 𝛿𝑡 is the measurement error and 𝑧𝑡
∗ is the “true” inventory surprise. In a regular OLS 
estimation, the impact of inventory surprises on returns is represented as follows:  
 
37 The EIA oil inventory survey usually covers about 90% of the population of oil companies, which leaves about 10% 
not surveyed. This may cause some noise in the estimates of the change in oil inventory. This issue is discussed at 
https://www.api.org/products-and-services/statistics/api-weekly-statistical-bulletin.  
38 For a more detailed discussion of the ITC technique in the context of energy inventory announcements, see Halova 
et al. (2014). 
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   𝑅𝑡 =  𝛾𝑧𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡,                    
𝑣𝑡 = 𝑡 − 𝛾𝛿𝑡. 
(A.3) 
However, the coefficient 𝛾 is biased since the regressor is correlated with error term. We 
can express the OLS estimate of the response coefficient as: 







This means that the OLS estimator is biased downwards. Rigobon and Sack (2008) argue 
that dealing with the measurement error bias presents an identification problem. They suggest this 
problem can be solved by noting that the measurement error is “censored” in periods with no 
announcements. In such periods both the “true” inventory surprise 𝑧𝑡
∗ and the measurement error 
𝛿𝑡 are zero. Using returns in the same intraday interval on the day before the announcement, 𝑅𝑡−1, 
the model parameters can be estimated using the generalized method of moments (GMM) based 
on the following set of moment conditions: 
 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑡−1) =  𝜎
2, 
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑡) =  𝛾
2𝜎𝑧∗
2 +  𝜎2,             
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑧𝑡) =  𝜎𝑧∗
2 +  𝜎𝛿
2, 




Solving these equations produces the following estimator of the market response 
coefficient: 
 𝛾 =  
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑡)−𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑡−1)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑡,𝑧𝑡)
.             (A.6) 
For returns on non-announcement days, we use the same intraday interval (from 10:25 am 
to 10:40 am) as the interval used to measure the returns around the announcement. 
 We compute the following pseudo-𝑅2 statistic to compare the explanatory power of the 
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ITC estimation with that of the OLS: 




 Intuitively, the pseudo-𝑅2 captures the fraction of return variance described by the model. 
We estimate the variance of the structural shocks 𝑡 using non-announcement returns. Therefore, 
equation (A.7) assumes that inventory surprises fully explain the post-announcement increase in 
the variance of returns.  
II.  Out-of-Sample Forecasting 
Several studies show that the predictors that seem to perform well in-sample may lose their 
predictive power out-of-sample (e.g., Welch and Goyal 2008). Hence, we conduct an out-of-
sample predictability analysis for our main empirical findings. We use the same methodology as 
in Welch and Goyal (2008). The benchmark model (Null) is the recursively estimated mean of the 
pre-EIA oil futures return. Subsequently, we compare the benchmark model with the following 
alternative predictive regression: 
 𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝑡 (A.8) 
where 𝑋𝑡−1 is either the post-API oil futures return or the predictor, which is computed as the 
difference between the API actual and the Bloomberg consensus forecast divided by the level of 
inventory. The performance of the predictive regression is evaluated by computing the difference 
between the cumulative squared predictions errors of the Null and the cumulative squared 
prediction errors of the Alternative. If this difference is positive, it means the Alternative performs 












The significant influence of oil on the performance of domestic and global markets is well 
documented in the literature (see, for e.g., Nandha and Faff, 2008; Ready, 2018; Sim and Zhou, 
2015; You, Guo, Zhu and Tang, 2017). Hamilton (2008) finds that the price of oil is one of the 
essential factors that triggered each recession since World War II. In a similar vein, Kilian and 
Park (2009); Kilian (2008, 2009); and Ready (2018), show the substantial impact of both oil supply 
and demand shocks on several economies and financial markets. Governments usually try to offset 
the influence of oil shocks using multiple channels, such as monetary policy, fiscal policy, trading 
policies, among others (Hamilton and Herrera, 2004; Kilian and Lewis, 2011). However, the 
solvency of these governments could be adversely affected, which raises concerns about their debt 
default risk (Chuffart and Hooper, 2019; Shahzad, Naifar, Hammoudeh, and Roubaud, 2017). In 
this paper, we investigate the impact of daily oil shocks on changes in the spreads of sovereign 
credit default swaps (CDS). 
There are several ways in which the price of oil can affect economies, and in particular the 
solvency of governments. For oil-importing and oil-exporting countries, the solvency of 
governments could be mainly influenced through changes in their current and future potential tax 
revenue, and through changes in the perception of their solvency risk. In the case of oil-importing 
 
* This essay is based on a paper coauthored with Ann Marie Hibbert.   
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countries, oil shocks affect governments’ tax revenue through several channels. Volatility and 
changes in the price of oil have pronounced effects on the cost of production and inflation, which 
in turn, influences governments' tax revenue as taxable income for both firms and individuals is 
affected (Cologni and Manera, 2008; Thoresen, 1982). Moreover, an increase in oil price can 
adversely impact the productivity of firms, and the potential output at any given level of capital 
for countries (Cunado and Perez De Gracia, 2005). Additionally, fluctuation in oil prices may 
increase economic uncertainty, leading to a decrease in irreversible corporate investments and 
foreign direct investments, which will potentially impact governments' tax revenue (Clark, 1996). 
In the case of oil-exporting countries, changes in oil prices will have a substantial impact on export 
revenues, fiscal balances, and government expenditure (Chuffart and Hooper, 2019). Hence, the 
sustainability of public finances and the financial soundness of oil exporters would change with 
oil shocks, which in turn affect the cost of insuring against default on sovereign debt. Finally, one 
would expect the perception of solvency risk to be altered for both oil-importing and oil-exporting 
countries since oil shocks have a significant impact on economies and financial markets (Kilian 
and Park, 2009; Kilian, 2009; Ready, 2018).  
Our main objective is to comprehensively analyze the impact of oil shocks on the perceived 
default risk of major oil-exporting and importing countries. Ready (2018) proposes a model to 
classify oil shocks. One benefit of this classification system is that it allows us to disentangle the 
oil supply and demand shocks at a higher frequency (daily) than was previously possible. We 
employ this classification and investigate the respective impact of supply and demand shocks on 
sovereign default risk, as proxied by changes in their CDS spreads. We hypothesize that how each 
type of shock affects a country’s default risk will depend on whether the country is a major oil 
importer or exporter. For example, a demand shock would most likely have a direct impact on the 
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economies of oil exporters but an indirect impact, (i.e via prices) on the economies of major oil 
importers. Conversely, a supply shock would more likely have an immediate (delayed) impact on 
net oil exporters (importers). 
In line with our main hypothesis, we first investigate the impact of oil supply and demand 
shocks on changes in the sovereign CDS spreads of (i) major oil-importing countries as proxied 
by a sample of G10 countries, and (ii) a sample of major oil-exporting countries. Since prior studies 
find that the determinants of sovereign CDS spreads vary across the conditional distribution of 
spread changes (Hibbert and Pavlova, 2017; Shahzad, Naifar, Hammoudeh, and Roubaud, 2017), 
we also investigate whether the impact of oil shocks varies across the quantiles of spread changes. 
A number of prior studies have documented nonlinear impacts of oil prices on stock markets 
and economies (Kilian and Vigfusson, 2011; Zhu, Su, You and Ren, 2017; Uddin, Rahman, 
Shahzad and Rehman, 2018). Our second goal is to investigate whether the impact of oil supply 
and demand shocks varies with the state of the economy. We first use a two-state Markov regime 
switching modeling to test whether there are non-linearities in the relation between oil shocks and 
changes in sovereign CDS spreads. We also investigate whether global economic conditions or a 
country’s dependence on oil influences the relation between oil shocks and changes in sovereign 
CDS spreads. 
We make at least four important contributions to the literature that investigates the factors that 
affect changes in sovereign CDS spreads. First, we provide robust evidence that oil supply and 
demand shocks have a significant impact on changes in the CDS spread of both the G10 countries 
as well as major oil-exporting countries. Our second contribution is to show how demand and 
supply shocks affect changes in spreads across the entire distribution of CDS changes using a 
quantile regression model. For both the G10 and oil-exporting countries, we find that demand 
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shocks affect spreads across all quantiles of the CDS changes. However, supply shocks affect 
spreads in only some quantiles. In the case of the G10 countries, the impact of supply shocks is 
more important in the extreme quantiles only while in the case of the oil-exporting countries, 
supply shocks are important in both the middle and upper quantiles. These findings are consistent 
with prior studies that report significant variation in the impact of some global factors across the 
distribution of sovereign CDS spreads.  
Our findings present a different picture than previous literature as we focus on the underlying 
causes of oil movements; oil supply and demand shocks (Da Fonseca, Ignatieva and Ziveyi, 2016; 
Wegener, Basse, Kunze, and Mettenheim, 2016). The differential impact of these shocks on each 
of our samples underlines the importance of identifying the source of changes in the price of oil, 
as well as the need to acknowledge the heterogeneity in the response of net oil-importers viz-a-viz 
oil-exporters. 
 Results of our bi-variate Markov regime switching modeling show that demand shocks 
have a significant impact in both high and low volatility states for the G10 countries and oil-
exporting countries. However, the magnitude of the impact of demand shocks is almost ten times 
higher during the more volatile state. On the other hand, supply shocks have a significant impact 
only in the high volatility state for the G10 countries and oil-exporting countries. We also find that 
the cumulative impact of oil shocks, as well as the standard deviations are statistically different 
across the two states for both the G10 and oil-exporting countries. These results support the 
importance of considering the nonlinearity assumption when examining the effect of oil shocks on 
sovereign CDS.  We also show that the impact of oil shocks on CDS spreads varies with the level 
of global economic activity as proxied by an index of world industrial production (see Hamilton, 
2019). We find that both supply and demand shocks significantly affect CDS spread changes for 
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the G10 countries in low levels of global economic activity, but neither shock has an impact during 
periods of high global economic activity. For oil-exporting countries, supply shocks only 
significantly lower CDS spreads during high levels of global economic activity, whereas demand 
shocks only affect spreads during low levels of global economic activity.  
 Finally, we show that the impact of oil shocks on spread changes depends on how reliant 
the country is on oil. Specifically, we find that the magnitude of the impact of oil shocks on changes 
in CDS spreads is stronger for the G10 countries that are more reliant on imported oil. Similarly, 
we find that supply shocks only significantly impact spreads for oil-exporting countries that are 
heavily reliant on oil revenue.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides a brief review of related 
literature and outlines our main research questions, Section 3.3 discusses the data, variable 
construction and provides univariate statistics, Section 3.4 describes our methodology, Section 3.5 
provides the empirical results and discussions, and Section 3.6 presents our conclusions. 
3.2. Related Literature and Research Questions 
There are two main strands of literature that are relevant to our study; first, there are those studies 
that investigate the relative importance of global versus domestic factors in explaining changes in 
sovereign CDS spreads, and the second are those studies that investigate the role of oil prices in 
explaining CDS spreads. We provide a brief review of each of these strands. 
3.2.1. Sovereign CDS Spreads: Global vs. Domestic Factors  
Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton (2011), one of the most widely cited papers in this area; 
study sovereign CDS for 26 different countries. They find that compared to country-specific 
factors, global market factors are more important in determining sovereign credit risk. In addition, 
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by decomposing the spreads for each country into risk-premium and default-risk components, they 
show that global factors have a more significant influence on default-risk components relative to 
the risk-premium component. In a similar vein, Pan and Singleton (2008) use CDS data for 
Mexico, Turkey and Korea and find a significant correlation between risk premiums and economic 
measures of global risk.  
 Several other studies support the significant influence of global factors on CDS spreads 
based on different regions, time periods, and empirical methodologies. For example, Augustin and 
T´edongap (2016) find that global macroeconomic factors significantly impact the full term 
structure of a geographically dispersed panel of 38 countries. Similarly, Dooley and Hutchison 
(2009) show that several financial and real economic news originating from the U.S. during the 
2007 financial crisis significantly affect sovereign CDS spreads in a sample of 14 emerging 
markets, and Oliveira, Curto and Nunes (2012) find that domestic factors greatly influence Euro-
denominated government bonds before the financial crisis, but global factors dominate during and 
after the crisis period. Furthermore, Wang and Moore (2012) employ a dynamic conditional 
correlation from a multivariate GARCH model to show that the correlation between sovereign 
CDS spreads in 38 developed and emerging countries are greatly driven by U.S. economic 
conditions. Fender, Hayo and Neuenkirch (2012) also find that emerging markets’ sovereign CDS 
are primarily driven by global and regional risk premia, and not by country-specific risk factors. 
These influences, by global and regional risk premia, are more pronounced during periods of 
economic stress than under ordinary periods.  
 There are other studies, however, that indicate the importance of domestic factors in 
determining sovereign CDS spreads. Ang and Longstaff (2013) find that local financial market 
factors influence the systematic risk of sovereign CDS for both the U.S. and Eurozone countries. 
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In addition, Beirne and Fratzscher (2013) analyze sovereign CDS spreads of 31 advanced and 
emerging economies during the European sovereign debt crisis. Their results show that, compared 
to global factors, country-specific and regional factors have more significant explanatory power. 
Afonso, Furceri, and Gomes (2012) conduct an event study to show that European Union sovereign 
bond yield and CDS spreads significantly respond to negative rating changes and outlook. 
Recently, Eichler (2014) shed light on the role of political factors in determining sovereign bond 
yield in 27 emerging markets during the period between 1996 and 2009. Their findings show that 
elections and the degree of democracy have limited influence on sovereign bond yield, whereas 
governance quality and parliamentary systems substantially affect sovereign bond yield.  
3.2.2. Oil as a Global Factor 
There is a body of literature that analyzes the interaction between oil and CDS. More closely 
related to our study are those that investigate the impact of oil on sovereign CDS spreads. An 
example is that of Chuffart and Hooper (2019), who use a Time-Varying Transition Probabilities 
Markov Switching model to analyze the impact of oil price and volatility on the CDS of Russia 
and Venezuela. They find that oil return has a significant impact on the CDS spread of Venezuela 
only during turbulent economic periods. In addition, they show that oil return significantly 
influences the CDS of Russia in all regimes (but) only before adding global factors.  
A few studies have made the distinction between oil-exporters versus oil-importers. For 
example, Naifar, Shahzad, and Hammoudeh (2017) show that oil price volatility more significantly 
affects sovereign CDS spreads of oil-rich countries than other major global regions such as the G7, 
BRICS, Council of Europe (CE), Asia, and North America (NA). Pavlova, Boyrie, and Parhizgari 
(2018) investigate the dynamic spillover of crude oil prices and volatilities on sovereign CDS 
spreads for oil-exporting countries. Their findings suggest that the spillover effects of the oil 
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market to sovereign CDS spreads, changes over time and is only significant for some countries. 
Similarly, Wegener, Basse, Kunze, and von Mettenheim (2016) use a VAR-GARCH model and 
find that positive oil price shocks lower the CDS spreads of Brazil, Malaysia, Norway, Qatar, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Venezuela. In terms 
of predictability, the empirical findings of  Shahzad, Naifar, Hammoudeh and Roubaud (2017) 
posit that oil volatility predicts sovereign CDS in different quantiles for the GCC and the other oil-
exporting countries.39 
 Unlike prior studies, we are the first to conduct a robust analysis of the impact of daily oil 
supply and demand shocks on the sovereign CDS spreads of major oil-exporting and oil-importing 
countries. Specifically, our four main hypotheses are: 
H1: Oil supply and demand shocks affect daily changes in the sovereign CDS spreads of oil-
importing and oil-exporting countries. 
H2: The impact of oil supply and demand shocks varies across the conditional distribution of sovereign 
spread changes. 
H3: The relation between oil supply and demand shocks and sovereign spread changes is state-
dependent. 
H4: The relation between oil supply and demand shocks and sovereign spread changes varies with the 
country’s dependence on oil. 
 
39 Some studies also investigate the impact of oil on corporate CDS spreads. See for example, Guo, Chen, and Huang 
(2011); Lahiani, Hammoudeh, and Gupta (2016); and Dai and Serletis (2018).  
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3.3. Data, Variable Construction and Univariate Statistics 
3.3.1. Sovereign CDS 
Sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) are financial contracts providing insurance for investors 
whendebt issuers default on their outstanding debts. Buyers of these contracts pay a premium in 
order to receive a contingent payment, which becomes due if the contractually stated event 
materializes (Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton, 2011). These premiums are usually quoted 
in basis points per notional value of the contracts. Each CDS has five main contractual features: 
(1) the debt issuer (e.g., sovereign entities in our study), (2) the outlined obligations, (3) the term 
of the contract, (4) a specified value for the notional principal, and (5) the potential events that 
prompt contingent payments. To investigate the impact of oil supply and demand shocks on 
sovereign default risk, we use the CDS of a sample of G10 countries and four major oil-exporting 
countries. The G10 countries included in our sample are the United States, the United Kingdom, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland.40 The oil-
exporting countries included in our sample are Russia, Iraq, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and 
Kazakhstan. These countries are selected based on two criteria: (1) they are among the largest oil-
exporting countries,41 and (2) Bloomberg provides data on their five-year CDS spreads.  
Appendix A provides the level of government debt for each of the countries in our sample, 
for the period from 2009 to 2018. In Panel A, we report the summary statistics of the level of 
government debt in billions of U.S. dollars. The U.S. and Japan have the highest mean sovereign 
debt of approximately 1.76 and 1.1 trillion dollars, respectively. In order to put the level of 
 
40 We do not include Canada as its CDS data is available only from the end of 2017.  




government debt into perspective, we report the percentage of debt to GDP in Panel B. Japan has 
the highest mean percentage of debt to GDP of 226.86%, followed by 125.52% for Italy.  
[Insert Panels A and B of Appendix A Here]  
We use the 5-year CDS for each of the countries in our sample as they are among the most 
liquid sovereign CDS. The sample period is from July 2009 to December 2018 for the G10 
countries, and from February 2011 to December 2018 for the oil-exporting countries. The start of 
the sample period is based on the availability of the data in Bloomberg. The sovereign CDS spreads 
are highly sensitive to changes in the solvency of countries. For instance, Greece faced substantial 
financial difficulty, which resulted in Greece missing its scheduled 1.55 billion euro payment on 
June 30, 2015. The 5-year sovereign CDS spread of Greece skyrocketed approximately five-fold 
from 1443.51 basis points on June 29, to 6739.21 basis points on June 30 (See Figure 1). 
[Insert Figure 1 Here]  
Figure 2 plots the evolution in spreads for each country in our sample. There is a spike in 
the CDS of most of the European countries between 2011 and 2012. This is approximately the 
time of the European debt crisis. In addition, there is a spike for both Russia and Iraq around the 
year 2015, which is just after the plunge of oil prices. 
[Insert Figure 2 Here]  
3.3.2. Oil Shocks Data and Variable Construction 
We follow Ready (2018) in constructing the oil shocks and so we use the same data. In order to 
construct the oil shocks, we need three variables: (1) daily prices of the one-month NYMEX - 
Light Sweet Crude Oil contract from the EIA website, (2) the World Integrated Oil and Gas 
Producer Index from Thomson Reuters Database, and (3) the CBOE volatility index (VIX) from 
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the CBOE website. The simple intuition behind this approach is that oil-producing firms are 
affected by demand shocks but have a natural hedge against supply shocks. A supply disruption 
that causes an oil price increase would offset the negative impact of the decrease of oil supply. 
According to this setup, demand shocks are defined as “the portion of contemporaneous returns of 
a global index of oil-producing firms which is orthogonal to unexpected changes in the log of the 
VIX index” (Ready, 2018). In addition, supply shocks are defined as “the portion of 
contemporaneous oil price changes which is orthogonal to demand shocks as well as to innovations 
in the VIX” (Ready, 2018).  
 We use similar notation as in  Ready (2018) to explain the method to construct the shocks. 
As mentioned before, this approach classifies oil shocks into supply, demand, and risk shocks by 
decomposing the change in oil prices. Supply shocks, 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑡, demand shocks, 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡 and 
risk shocks 𝑣𝑡 are assumed to be orthogonal and defined as follows: 













⌉    (1) 
The identified shocks in matrix A are mapped into observable variables as follows: 
𝑋𝑡 = 𝐴𝑍𝑡      (2) 
To achieve the objective of imposing orthogonality, we satisfy: 







]𝑋      (3) 
𝛴𝑋 represents the covariance matrix of the observable 𝑋𝑡, and 𝜎𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦, 𝜎𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 , 𝜎𝑣  are the 
volatilities of the identified shocks. This procedure can be considered a simple renormalization of 
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the standard orthogonalization that is employed to define the structural shocks in a SVAR 
framework.  In addition, we aggregate the shocks to sum up to the total change in the oil price.  
3.3.3. Other Variables 
Our choice of control variables is motivated by prior studies, discussed in Section 2 (Chuffart and 
Hooper 2019; Hibbert and Pavlova 2017; Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton,  2011). The 
control variables can be categorized into two groups. The first group includes two domestic 
variables: (1) St. Return is the daily return for each country’s stock market, and (2) FX Rate is the 
change in the exchange rate for each country’s currency against the U.S. dollar. Appendix B list 
the respective index that we use for each country’s stock market. In the case of the U.S., we use 
the Trade Weighted U.S. Dollar index, which is “a weighted average of the foreign exchange value 
of the U.S. dollar against a subset of the broad index currencies”42. The second group consists of 
variables intended to capture global factors. These include: the change in the TED spread 
(∆TedRate) the change in the CBOE volatility index (ΔVIX), the S&P 500 index return (S&P500), 
the change in the Euro Stoxx 50 Volatility index (ΔV2X), the change in the German 10-year Bond 
yield (ΔGerman Bond), the change in the effective Federal Fund rate (ΔFedFund), the change in 
the European Repo rate (ΔEuro Repo), and the change in the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield 
(ΔTreasury).43 The data for all control variables is from Bloomberg. 
 To measure global economic activity, we use the monthly industrial production index for 
the OECD and six other major countries (Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, the Russian Federation, 
and South Africa).44 Hamilton (2019) highlights the superiority of this index compared to other 
 
42 More information on the index is at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis website. 
43 We take first differences for all the variables other than the returns variables as they have a unit root based on the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. 
44 The data is from Professor James Hamilton’s website: https://econweb.ucsd.edu/~jhamilton/#publications. 
Baumeister and Hamilton (2019) extend the original index to the present. 
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alternative indexes of real economic activity. To measure each country’s oil dependency, for the 
G10 countries, we use the ratio of energy imports to total domestic energy; a higher ratio indicates 
a higher dependency. We use the ratio of oil rents to GDP to differentiate between high and low 
oil revenue dependency for the oil-exporting countries. The data for the two proxies of the 
country’s oil dependency is from the World Bank database.  
3.3.4. Univariate Statistics 
In Panels A and B of Table 1, we report summary statistics for the daily sovereign CDS spread 
changes over our sample period. We provide results for the G10 countries in Panel A, and in Panel 
B, we provide similar analysis for the oil-exporting countries. For the G10 countries, we see that 
Italy experiences the highest average spread change, while Sweden has the lowest. Among the oil-
exporting countries, Iraq has the highest mean change in spreads, whereas UAE has the lowest. 
Comparing the results in Panel A to those in Panel B shows that the spread change of the oil-
exporting countries are largely more volatile than those of the G10 countries. In Panel C of Table 
1, we report summary statistics for the control variables used in our multivariate analyses discussed 
in Section 4. All of our data series are well behaved, with values similar to those reported in prior 
studies. 
[Insert Table 1 Here]  
 We report the correlation between all the countries’ CDS spread changes in Panel A of 
Table 2. The correlation between spread changes for countries in the same region is relatively high. 
For instance, the correlation between the CDS of Germany and France is 0.79, and that between 
the Netherlands and Belgium is 0.69, with both being highly statistically significant. In Panel B 
we report the correlation between all our control variables. The correlation between almost all the 
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control variables is moderately low. Furthermore, the correlation between the oil shocks and all 
the control variables is very low.   
[Insert Table 2 Here]  
3.4. Methodology  
 3.4.1. Main Regression Model 
We start our baseline analysis by using the following regression model to test our first hypothesis 








𝛾𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡−1 +  𝛿𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑡−1 +  𝑖,𝑡     (4) 
where ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the daily change in spreads of countries denoted by i over days denoted by t, 
∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 is the one-day lagged change in spreads, included to allow for any autocorrelation in 
spread changes, 𝐷𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐼𝐶𝑗,𝑖,𝑡  is the set of domestic control variables denoted by j for each 
country denoted by i, and 𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵𝐴𝐿𝑗,𝑡 is the set of global control variables denoted by j, described 
in Section 3.3. Our main variables of interest are 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡−1, the one-day lagged shock to the 
demand side of oil, and 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑡−1, the one-day lagged shock to the supply side of oil, both 
constructed based on Ready’s (2018) method described briefly in Section 3.2. We estimate the 
model in (4) using both pooled ordinary least squares as well as a panel regression model separately 
for the sample of G10 countries and for the oil-exporting countries. We report standard errors that 
are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the country level to account for serial dependency 
for the panel regression model with country and year fixed effects to control for heterogeneity 
across countries and years, respectively.  
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3.4.2. Quantile Regressions 
To test our second hypothesis, we follow Koenker (2004) who develops the panel data model for 
quantile regression. Koenker (2004) starts the model with a classical linear random-effects model: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 +  𝛼𝑖 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡     (5) 
In our context, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the daily change in the CDS spread, t is the daily observation for each country 
i, and 𝛼𝑖 is intended to represent unobserved heterogeneity across countries that is not captured by 
the control variables in the model. The conditional quantile functions of the response of the ith 
country in day t is given by: 
𝑄𝑦𝑖𝑡(𝑞|𝑥𝑖𝑡) =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽(𝑞)     (6) 
According to this formula, the conditional quantiles for the dependent variable are affected by the 
pure location shift 𝛼𝑖. The effects of 𝛼𝑖 are not allowed to depend on the quantile of interest, q, 
however the covariates 𝑥𝑖𝑡 are allowed to. The model in expression (6) can be estimated 
simultaneously for several quantiles by solving the following model: 
𝑚𝑖𝑛
(𝛼, 𝛽)






𝑘 = 1   (7) 
where 𝜌𝑞(𝑢) = 𝑢(𝑘 − 𝐼(𝑢 < 0)) represents the piecewise linear quantile loss function of 
Koenker and Bassett (1978). According to Koenker (2004), equation (7) can be iteratively solved 
by a sequence of diagonally weighted least squares steps using Cholesky factorization. Expression 
(7) can be rearranged to present the panelized version as: 
𝑚𝑖𝑛
(𝛼, 𝛽)








𝑘 = 1   (8)  
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Based on Koenker (2004), we get an estimate of the model purged of the fixed effects as λ →
 ∞ the 𝛼?̂? → 0. 
3.4.3. Markov Switching  
To test our third hypothesis, whether the impact of supply and demand shocks on sovereign CDS 
is state-dependent, we develop a Markov-switching panel model. Asea and Blomberg (1998) is 
one of the first papers that employ the Markov-switching panel model. Their approach was later 
extended by several other papers such as Cermeño (2002), Chen (2007), and Zhu et al. (2017). We 
follow Zhu et al. (2017) since they conduct a very similar analysis to ours. Starting with the model 
in expression (4), we construct the bivariate Markov-switching panel model as: 
∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0,𝑖,𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽1∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑








𝛾𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡−1 +  𝛿𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑡−1 +  𝑖,𝑡                               (9) 
Specifically, our aim is to allow the impact of 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡−1, and 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑡−1 to be dependent on the 
regime 𝑆𝑡 at time t.  This state-dependent impact is captured by the coefficients, γst  and δst . 
 The transition probability matrix for St, which is an unobservable two-regime Markov 




)                                                        (10) 
where 𝑝𝑖𝑗= p (𝑆𝑡 = 𝑗|𝑆𝑡−1 = 𝑖), with ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑗
2
𝑗=1 = 1 for regime i (i = 1,2). We also assume that the 
regime switching process follows a first-order Markov chain. We estimate the model with two 
states, state-dependent regression oil shocks’ coefficients, and state-dependent volatility for the 
87 
 
error process. Specifically, the Markov-switching model is estimated using student t distribution 
as it improves the stability of the regimes.  
  To measure the accuracy and fit of the Markov-switching model, we follow Ang and 
Bekaert (2002) and compute the regime classification measure (RCM): 
RCM = 100 𝑆2  
1
𝑇




𝑡=1                                               (11) 
RCM is the average of the product smooth probabilities p, and S is the number of states. The RCM 
ranges between 0 and 100, where 0 indicates that the Markov-Switching model perfectly classifies 
regimes and 100 indicates the model’s failure to classify regimes. Hence, low RCM values are 
better than high RCM values.  
3.5. Results and Discussion  
3.5.1. The Impact of Oil Shocks on Sovereign CDS Spreads  
In this section, we discuss the results of our empirical tests of hypotheses 1 and 2. We start with a 
discussion of the results for the model in Equation (4). Table 3 provides results separately for the 
G10 countries and the major oil-exporting countries. We find consistent results between the pooled 
OLS regression model and the panel model with fixed effects for both groups of countries.45 For 
the G10 countries, demand shocks significantly lower the spreads of the sovereign CDS. A positive 
demand shock leads to a decrease in spreads of about 0.12 basis points. These results are consistent 
with the view that positive demand shocks are indicators of healthy economies (Kilian, 2009; 
Ready, 2018). Thus, we find generally that demand-driven movements of oil prices lower the 
sovereign default credit risk of oil-importing countries. Conversely, supply shocks increase the 
 
45 In unreported results, we estimate a panel regression model without fixed effects. Also, we estimate a panel 
regression model without control variables other than the oil supply and demand shocks. The results, available upon 
request, are consistent with those reported. 
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spreads of the G10 CDS. A one unit positive supply shock results in a significant 0.04 basis points 
increase in spreads. Supply shocks cause an almost immediate increase in uncertainty regarding 
oil supply, which increases spreads of G10 countries.46 
The results for the major oil-exporting countries show that both oil supply and demand 
shocks lower the spreads of the sovereign CDS for the oil-exporting countries. The finding that a 
demand shock causes a decrease in spreads for oil exporters is intuitive since an increase in demand 
for oil is good news for oil exporters. Similarly, a supply shock, consistent with a decrease would 
likely lead to an increase in prices and would have a favorable impact on the economies of oil 
exporters, resulting in lower spreads. Thus, both shocks mainly convey good news for those 
countries.47  
[Insert Table 3 Here]  
Table 4 reports estimates of the quantile regression model for the G10 countries and the 
major oil-exporting countries. The low quantile indicates low default risk, whereas the upper 
quantile indicates a high default risk. In Panel A of Table 4, we find that demand shocks affect 
spreads across all the quantiles for the G10 countries. However, supply shocks have a relatively 
limited influence in the middle quantile of the spreads. Hence, the supply-driven oil movements 
mostly affect spreads at the tails of default risk. These findings are consistent with the literature 
that shows a significant impact of oil during turbulent periods of sovereign debt (Chuffart and 
Hooper, 2019). The results for the oil-exporting countries, reported in Panel B of Table 4 show 
 
46 In unreported results, we estimate a panel regression without Italy, in the case of G10 countries, as the standard 
deviation of its CDS spread is large compared to that for other countries (see Table 1). We also estimate a panel 
regression without the U.S. as its dependence on imported oil has been changing. The results, available upon request, 
are consistent with those reported. 
47 In unreported results, we estimate a panel regression without Iraq, in the case of oil-exporting countries, as the 
standard deviation of its CDS spread is quite large compared to that for other countries (see Table 1). The results, 
available upon request, are consistent with those reported. 
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that demand shocks have a significant effect across the entire conditional distribution of spread 
changes, but the supply shocks mostly impact the upper quantiles. These results indicate that 
supply shocks mainly impact spreads when the default risk is high. However, supply shocks seem 
to have a limited effect on the left tail of the distribution of spread changes, i.e. when there is low 
default risk.  
[Insert Table 4 Here]  
 Together the results so far provide evidence in support of Hypotheses 1 and 2. Specifically, 
both oil supply and demand shocks affect changes in spreads of the G10 countries and major oil-
exporting countries. CDS spreads decrease due to oil demand shocks for both the G10 countries 
and oil-exporting countries. In contrast, oil supply shocks increase the spreads of the G10 
countries, but reduce the spreads of oil-exporting countries. Furthermore, the effect varies across 
the conditional distribution of spread changes for these countries.  
3.5.2. Regime Switching Model and Other Tests  
The nonlinearity of oil prices and shocks have been the subject of extensive discussions in the 
energy literature (Kilian and Vigfusson, 2011; Zhu, Su, You and Ren, 2017; Uddin, Rahman, 
Shahzad and Rehman, 2018). In this section, we first investigate whether the impact of oil shocks 
that we report in the previous sub-section is state-dependent, i.e. we test our third hypothesis. State 
1 is the low volatility state and State 2 is the high volatility state, as measured by the variance in 
each respective state. We confirm (in unreported results) that the cumulative impact of oil shocks 
and the states’ standard deviations (sigmas) are different between the two states. In addition, the 
RCM values for both the G10 countries and oil-exporting countries, reported in Table 5, confirm 
that the model fits the data very well. Figure 3 graphs the smoothed probabilities of the high 
volatility state for each group of countries. For most of our sample period, the probability of 
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spreads being in the high volatility state is largely consistent with major world events. 
Furthermore, the probability of spreads being in high or low volatility states for each group of 
countries is very similar. An exception is the period from around 2015-2016 when only the spreads 
of the oil-exporting countries were largely in a high volatility state. 
[Insert Table 5 and Figure 3 Here]  
Table 6 provides results for the bivariate Markov-Switching model given in equation 9. 
For both the G10 countries and oil-exporting countries, demand shocks have a significant influence 
on spreads in both high and low volatility states, while supply shocks impact spreads only in the 
more volatile state. Furthermore, both demand and supply shocks have a larger impact on spreads 
in the more volatile state. For instance, a positive demand shock leads to a significant 0.07 basis 
point decrease in spreads of the G10 countries in the low volatility state whereas it leads to a 
significant 0.66 basis point decrease in spreads in the highly volatile state. The results in Table 6 
also show that within each state, the magnitude of the impact of both supply and demand shocks 
is significantly greater for the oil-exporting countries compared to the G10 countries. Together 
these results are in support of our third hypothesis that the impact of oil shocks on sovereign spread 
changes is state-dependent.   
[Insert Table 6 Here]  
 We also examine the influence of economic conditions and the countries’ oil dependence 
on the relation between oil shocks and changes in spreads. In Table 7, we show that oil shocks 
have a significant influence on spreads only during low economic activity periods. These results 
indicate that the G10 countries are more prone to the effect of oil shocks during times of economic 
downturns. On the other hand, we find that supply shocks lower the spreads of oil-exporting 
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countries only during high economic activity. The demand for oil would be elevated during periods 
of high global economic activity, thus, a disruption in oil supply would likely result in a significant 
increase in oil price which potentially has positive consequences for oil exporters. We find that 
demand shocks lower the spreads of oil-exporting countries only during periods of low economic 
activity. When the global economy slows down, oil exporters most likely will be negatively 
affected. Hence, an increase in the oil price due to demand shocks during these adverse periods 
would deliver good news for oil exporters as they likely need additional revenue.  
[Insert Table 7 Here]  
 Finally, we analyze the influence of the countries’ oil dependency on the relation between 
oil shocks and changes in sovereign spreads. We use the ratio of energy imports to total domestic 
energy use to differentiate between high and low oil imports dependency for the G10 countries. 
The results in Panel A of Table 8 show that the magnitude of the influence of oil shocks on spreads 
is greater for countries that are highly dependent on imported oil. These results are of great 
importance for policymakers, institutions and portfolio managers in the G10 countries. The debate 
regarding the reliance on imported and conventional oil may benefit from the results of this study. 
For oil-exporting countries, we use the ratio of oil rents to GDP, to differentiate between high and 
low oil revenue dependency. The results for the oil-exporting countries in Panel B of Table 8 show 
that supply shocks affect only countries that are heavily reliant on oil revenue. 
[Insert Table 8 Here]  
3.6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine the effect of oil shocks on sovereign CDS spreads. Our sample of 
countries consists of the G10 countries and major oil-exporting countries. Using the recently 
developed classification of oil shocks by Ready (2018), we provide robust evidence that oil 
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demand shocks lower the spreads of the sovereign CDS for both the G10 countries and the oil-
exporting countries, with the effect of oil demand shocks being significant across all quantiles for 
both groups of countries. On the other hand, oil supply shocks increase the spreads of the G10 
countries, but lower the spreads of oil-exporting countries, with the impact concentrating in the 
upper quantiles of spreads. We also test for nonlinearity by employing two-state Markov-switching 
modeling and find the significant influence of oil shocks mostly concentrates in a highly volatile 
state.  In addition, the impact of oil shocks on the changes of CDS spreads is sensitive to the global 
economic conditions and to the country’s dependence on oil. 
 Our results are beneficial for governments, corporations, and international organizations. 
The sensitivity of the sovereign CDS spreads to oil shocks underlines the importance of designing 
and structuring hedging strategies against this type of risk. Governments may benefit from the 
results in this study as they consider their reliance and exposure to oil shocks Moreover, our study 
underscores the importance of assessing the nonlinearity between sovereign CDS and global 
determinants such as oil shocks.  
93 
 
Appendix A: Essay 3 
I. Summary Statistics of each Country’s Sovereign Debt 
The level of each country’s government debt is from the World Bank database and the percentage 
of debt to GDP is from the IMF database. The sample period is from 2009 – 2018. 
 Panel A – Government Debt in Billion of USD  
  N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Belgium 10         518.2          31.6          482.1          570.6  
France 10      2,479.4        177.0       2,232.9       2,733.1  
Germany 10      2,679.7        254.5       2,408.0       2,994.9  
Italy 10      2,587.2        149.3       2,411.3       2,836.0  
Japan 10    11,870.0     1,242.9     10,166.0     14,205.4  
Netherlands 10         523.5          50.6          473.3          605.9  
Sweden 10         213.2          22.9          175.9          258.5  
Switzerland 10         282.7          21.8          238.8          304.9  
United Kingdom 10      2,237.0        333.7       1,525.5       2,640.2  
United States 10    17,600.9     2,862.0     12,527.2     21,375.4  
Iraq 10          91.1          17.0           74.1          113.8  
Kazakhstan 10          27.1           9.1           11.8           40.4  
Russia 10         232.9          60.8          121.0          331.7  
UAE 10          66.8           6.7           61.0           79.1  
 
Panel B – Government Debt as a Percentage of GDP 
  N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Belgium 10 103.7 2.8 99.5 107.5 
France 10 92.5 5.6 83.0 98.4 
Germany 10 73.8 6.9 61.7 82.3 
Italy 10 125.5 7.9 112.5 132.2 
Japan 10 226.9 12.7 201.0 237.1 
Netherlands 10 61.5 5.3 52.4 68.0 
Sweden 10 40.4 2.6 37.2 45.0 
Switzerland 10 42.7 1.0 40.5 44.1 
United Kingdom 10 82.6 7.7 63.7 87.9 
United States 10 101.6 6.2 86.7 106.8 
Iraq 10 51.1 17.2 32.0 87.4 
Kazakhstan 10 15.3 4.9 10.2 21.9 
Russia 10 13.6 2.5 9.9 16.4 




Appendix B: Essay 3 
I. Stock Exchanges 
This table reports the stock exchanges used to compute the domestic stock market return variable 
(St. Return) in our analyses. 
Country Stock Exchange 
USA Dow Jones  
UK FTSE 100 
France CAC 40 
Germany DAX 
Italy FTSE MIB 
Japan Nikkei 225 
Belgium BEL 20 
Netherlands AEX 
Sweden OMX Stockholm 30 
Switzerland Swiss Market Index 
Russia MXRU Russia stock 
Iraq Iraq Stock Exchange (ISX) 
UAE Abu Dhabi Securities Market General Index 





Table 1: Summary Statistics of CDS Spread Changes 
This table presents summary statistics of the variables used in the analyses. Panels A and B summarize 
the daily CDS spread change for the G10 countries and the major oil-exporting countries, respectively, 
and Panel C summarizes the control variables. Spreads are reported in basis points. St. Return is the 
daily return for each country’s stock market, FX Rate is the exchange rate for each country against the U.S. 
dollar. TedRate is the TED spread, VIX is the CBOE volatility index, Oil Realized Volatility is the square 
root of the sum of squared five-minute returns of oil futures prices. V2X is the Euro Stoxx 50 Volatility 
index, Oil price is the one-month price of oil future contract, Demand is a shock to the demand side of oil, 
Supply is a shock to the supply side of oil, both shocks constructed based on Ready’s (2018) method. 
S&P500 is the S&P 500 index return, German Bond is the German 10-year Bond yield, FedFund is the 
effective Federal Fund rate, Euro. Repo is the daily rate of the European Repo, Treasury is the 10-year U.S. 
Treasury yield. A list of the countries’ stock market is provided in Appendix A. The sample period is 
from July 2009 to December 2018 for the G10 countries and from February 2011 to December 2018 
for the major oil-exporting countries. The oil-exporting countries are Russia, Iraq, UAE, and 
Kazakhstan.  
Panel A – Daily Change of CDS Spread for G10 Countries 
       N Mean Std. Dev.     Min    Max 
All 24,754 -0.004 3.68 -72.50 109.00 
Belgium 2,476 -0.010 4.59 -57.52 37.14 
France 2,476  0.002 3.16 -30.28 23.30 
Germany 2,476 -0.007 1.54 -14.50 11.13 
Italy 2,476  0.051 9.27 -72.50 109.00 
Japan 2,476 -0.009 1.97 -17.36 19.28 
Netherlands 2,476 -0.012 1.78 -14.41 15.44 
Sweden 2,476 -0.018 1.22 -7.76 8.69 
Switzerland 2,470 -0.020 1.75 -17.06 43.73 
UK 2,476 -0.012 1.61 -17.92 13.66 
USA 2,476 -0.005 1.26 -10.47 12.47 
 
 
Panel B – Daily Change of CDS Spread for Oil-Exporting Countries 
  N Mean  Std. Dev.          Min        Max 
All 8,180 0.017 10.02 -105.09 304.78 
Iraq 2,059 0.079 16.93 -105.09 304.78 
Kazakhstan 2,059 -0.039 6.46 -51.41 51.31 
Russia 1,981 0.037 8.27 -88.41 66.96 





Table 1: (Continued) 
Panel C – Control Variables 
 
  N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
St. Return 24,165 0.023 1.278 -13.923 12.195 
ΔFX Rate 24,747 0.001 0.188 -3.940 3.300 
ΔTedRate 24,330 0.000 0.015 -0.080 0.090 
ΔVIX 24,700 0.000 1.593 -12.940 20.010 
ΔV2X 24,299 -0.015 1.640 -10.937 12.783 
Demand 24,700 0.000 0.972 -5.764 3.949 
Supply 24,700 -0.001 1.575 -7.742 8.236 
S&P500 Return 24,720 0.045 0.924 -6.663 4.741 
ΔGerman Bond 24,760 -0.001 0.043 -0.257 0.229 
ΔFedFund 24,760 0.430 0.001 0.023 -0.150 
ΔEuro. Repo 24,660 0.460 0.000 0.013 -0.250 
ΔTreasury 24,760 2.490 0.000 0.049 -0.200 
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Table 2: Correlation Between the Main Variables 
Panel A reports the correlation between changes in the 5-year sovereign CDS spread for each of the countries in our sample and Panel 
B reports the correlation between the explanatory variables used in the analyses. St. Return is the daily return for each country’s stock 
market (described in Appendix A), FX Rate is the exchange rate for each country’s currency against the U.S. dollar. TedRate is the TED 
spread, VIX is the CBOE volatility index, S&P500 is the S&P 500 index return, V2X is the Euro Stoxx 50 Volatility index, German 
Bond is the German 10-year Bond yield, FedFund is the effective Federal Fund rate, Euro. Repo is the daily European Repo rate, 
Treasury is the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield. Demand is a shock to the demand side of oil, and Supply is a shock to the supply side of 
oil, both shocks constructed based on Ready’s (2018) method. Correlations in bold are significant at the 5% level or higher.The sample 
period is from July 2009 to December 2018 for the G10 countries and February 2011 to December 2018 for the oil-exporting countries. 
Panel A – The Correlation Between Daily Changes in Sovereign CDS Spreads 
 USA UK France Germany Italy Japan Belgium Netherlands Sweden Switzerland Russia Iraq UAE 
UK 0.23             
France 0.21 0.65            
Germany 0.22 0.69 0.79           
Italy 0.17 0.55 0.70 0.59          
Japan 0.13 0.34 0.33 0.37 0.31         
Belgium 0.22 0.64 0.80 0.74 0.70 0.31        
Netherlands 0.21 0.6 0.71 0.72 0.58 0.34 0.69       
Sweden 0.23 0.52 0.56 0.57 0.45 0.28 0.56 0.57      
Switzerland 0.08 0.40 0.35 0.39 0.25 0.26 0.36 0.38 0.31     
Russia 0.13 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.33 0.32 0.25 0.17    
Iraq 0.02 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.13   
UAE 0.14 0.29 0.28 0.32 0.28 0.35 0.29 0.29 0.22 0.19 0.40 0.09  
Kazakhstan 0.14 0.37 0.38 0.40 0.36 0.36 0.38 0.37 0.29 0.19 0.65 0.12 0.43 
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Table 2: (Continued) 
 
Panel B – The Correlation Between the Explanatory Variables Used in the Analyses 
 









ΔFX Rate -0.050           
ΔTedRate -0.030 -0.024          
ΔVIX -0.460 -0.080 0.004         
ΔV2X -0.620 -0.075 0.001 0.570        
S&P500 Return 0.570 0.082 -0.029 -0.830 -0.540       
ΔGerman Bond 0.390 0.072 -0.040 -0.280 -0.380 0.350      
ΔFedFund -0.024 0.004 0.049 0.014 0.004 -0.020 0.010     
ΔEuro. Repo 0.010 -0.001 -0.008 -0.010 0.010 0.020 0.030 -0.001    
ΔTreasury 0.310 0.145 -0.070 -0.360 -0.340 0.440 0.630 0.020 0.020   
Demand 0.020 0.010 0.030 -0.020 0.050 0.030 0.001 -0.023 -0.030 0.030  
Supply 0.010 -0.010 -0.020 0.010 -0.010 0.000 0.020 0.030 0.010 0.010 0.000 
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Table 3: Pooled and Panel Regressions  
This table reports the estimates for a pooled OLS regression model and a panel regression model with 
fixed effects of the following model: 








𝛾𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡−1 +  𝛿𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑡−1 +  𝑖,𝑡 
ΔCDSi,t is the daily change in sovereign CDS spread of countries denoted by i over days denoted by 
t, and  ΔCDSi,t-1 is the one day lagged change in spreads. DOMESTICj,i,,t  is the two control variables 
included for each country: the daily return on each country’s stock market (St. Return), and the daily 
change in the exchange rate of each country’s currency against the U.S. dollar (ΔFX Rate). GLOBALj,t 
is the set of global control variables: the daily change in the CBOE volatility index (ΔVIX ), the daily 
S&P 500 index return (S&P500 Return), the daily change in the German 10-year Bond yield 
(ΔGerman Bond), the daily change in the effective Federal Fund rate (ΔFedFund), the daily change 
in the European Repo rate (ΔEuro. Repo), the daily change in the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield 
(ΔTreasury), the daily change in the TED spread (ΔTedRate), and the change in the Euro Stoxx 50 
Volatility index (ΔV2X). Demandt-1 is the one day lagged shock to the demand side of oil, and Supplyt-
1 is the one day lagged shock to the supply side of oil, both shocks constructed as in Ready (2018). 
We report results separately for the G10 countries (excluding Canada) and for a sample of major oil-
exporting countries. The major oil-exporting countries include Russia, Iraq, UAE, and Kazakhstan. 
(We exclude ΔTedRate and ΔV2X from our oil-exporters model.) We report robust standard errors in 
parentheses below each estimate. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
The sample period is from July 2009 to December 2018 for the G10 countries and from February 
2011 to December 2018 for the oil-exporting countries.  
100 
 
Table 3: (Continued) 
 G10 Countries  Oil-Exporting  Countries 
 Pooled 
OLS 




Intercept -0.005  0.223**  -0.004  0.386** 
 (0.021)  (0.068)  (0.121)  (0.120) 
ΔCDSi,t-1 0.122***  0.121***  -0.088***  -0.089 
 (0.028)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.051) 
St. Returni,t -1.106***  -1.106*  -0.013  -0.013 
 (0.055)  (0.523)  (0.008)  (0.015) 
∆FX Ratei,t -0.592***  -0.584*  0.070**  0.070 
 (0.088)  (0.282)  (0.031)  (0.088) 
∆VIXt 0.024  0.024  0.097  0.096 
 (0.047)  (0.060)  (0.139)  (0.077) 
S&P500 
Returnt 
0.233***  0.229  -1.529***  -1.527** 
 (0.072)  (0.268)  (0.254)  (0.461) 
ΔGerman 
Bondt 
-10.991***  -11.026**  -14.443***  -14.279** 
 (1.086)  (4.420)  (3.702)  (3.203) 
ΔFedFundt -1.642**  -1.609**  -6.329  -5.956** 
 (0.647)  (0.606)  (5.292)  (1.663) 
ΔEuro. Repot -6.928  -7.171**  3.589  3.601 
 (4.316)  (3.014)  (7.699)  (2.136) 
ΔTreasuryt -1.001  -0.956  0.798  0.828 
 (0.857)  (0.848)  (3.609)  (3.677) 
ΔV2Xt 0.001  0.002     
 (0.027)  (0.098)     
ΔTedRatet 1.710  1.607     
 (1.389)  (1.030)     
Demandt-1 -0.114***  -0.121***  -1.292***  -1.287** 
 (0.030)  (0.023)  (0.128)  (0.374) 
Supplyt-1 0.036**  0.035**  -0.151**  -0.149** 
 (0.014)  (0.011)  (0.074)  (0.034) 
Country FE No  Yes  Yes  No 
Year FE No  Yes  Yes  No 
R2 0.21  0.21  0.05  0.05 
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Table 4: Quantile Regression Model of Daily Spread Changes 
This table reports estimates for a quantile regression daily changes in sovereign CDS spreads on oil 
demand and supply shocks. DOMESTICj,i,t and GLOBALj,t are the set of control variables described 
in Table 3 and in the text. Demandt-1 is the one day lagged shock to the demand side of oil, and 
Supplyt-1 is the one day lagged shock to the supply side of oil, both shocks constructed as in Ready 
(2018).  Panel A includes all the G10 countries except for Canada, and Panel B includes Russia, Iraq, 
UAE, and Kazakhstan. We report robust standard errors in parentheses below each estimate. ***, **, * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The sample period is from July 2009 to 
December 2018 for the G10 countries and from February 2011 to December 2018 for the oil-
exporting countries. 
Panel A: G10 Countries 
                                                                           Quantile      
 0.25 0.50 0.75 
Intercept -0.685*** -0.014** 0.656*** 
 (0.017) (0.005) (0.016) 
ΔCDSi,t-1 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.092*** 
 (0.023) (0.017) (0.021) 
Demandt-1 -0.097*** -0.059*** -0.080*** 
 (0.013) (0.006) (0.008) 
Supplyt-1 0.013** 0.003 0.017** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) 
    
DOMESTICj,i,t   YES YES YES 
GLOBALj,t YES YES YES 
 
Panel B: Oil-Exporting Countries 
Quantile 
 0.25 0.50 0.75 
Intercept -2.318*** -0.097* 2.801*** 
 (0.217) (0.057) (0.239) 
ΔCDSi,t-1 0.007 0.014* 0.029*** 
 (0.018) (0.008) (0.008) 
Demandt-1 -0.458*** -0.338*** -0.641*** 
 (0.104) (0.043) (0.116) 
Supplyt-1 0.002 -0.041** -0.082* 
 (0.041) (0.016) (0.045) 
DOMESTICj,i,t YES YES YES 




Table 5: Transition Probabilities, Expected Duration and other Indicators  
This table reports transition probabilities of a Markov Switching panel regression model of daily 
changes in CDS spreads on oil demand and supply shocks. The transition probabilities are reported 
as 𝑃𝑖𝐽. The expected duration of being in state i are reported as 𝐷𝑈𝑖 i.e., DU1 for state 1 and DU2 for 
state 2. Sigma 1 and Sigma 2 are the standard deviation of state 1 and 2, respectively. The maximized 
log-likelihood value is denoted as LL. The RCM is the regime classification measure. The G10 
sample includes all the G10 countries except for Canada, and the Oil-exporting countries sample 
includes Russia, Iraq, UAE, and Kazakhstan. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. The sample period is from July 2009 to December 2018 for the G10 countries and from 
February 2011 to December 2018 for the oil-exporting countries. 
 
  
 P11 P12 P21 P22 DU1 DU2 Sigma 1 Sigma 2 LL RCM 




0.94 0.06 0.19 0.81 16.2 5.15 2.58*** 20.11*** -20,505.46 0.005 
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Table 6: Markov Switching Panel Model 
This table reports estimates of a Markov Switching panel regression model of daily changes in 
sovereign CDS spreads on oil demand and supply shocks. DOMESTICj,i,t and GLOBALj,t are the set 
of control variables described in Table 3 and in the text. Demandt-1 is the one day lagged shock to the 
demand side of oil, and Supplyt-1 is the one day lagged shock to the supply side of oil, both shocks 
constructed as in Ready (2018). The G10 sample includes all countries except for Canada, and the 
major oil-exporting countries’ column includes the following countries: Russia, Iraq, UAE, and 
Kazakhstan. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The sample period is 
from July 2009 to December 2018 for the G10 countries and from February 2011 to December 2018 
for the oil-exporting countries. 
 
State 1  G 10  Exporting Countries 
     
Demandt-1       -0.072***      -0.259*** 
  (0.007)  (0.047) 
Supplyt-1  0.007   -0.031 
   (0.004)  (0.026) 
DOMESTICj,i,t  YES  YES 
GLOBALj,t  YES  YES 
State 2  G 10  Exporting Countries 
     
Demandt-1       -0.658***       -2.484*** 
  (0.092)  (0.428) 
Supplyt-1     0.114*      -0.532** 
  (0.063)  (0.261) 
DOMESTICj,i,t  YES  YES 






Table 7: The Effect of Global Economic Conditions on the Relation Between Soverign CDS 
Spreads and Oil Shocks 
 
This table reports estimates for a panel regression model of daily changes in sovereign CDS spreads 
on oil demand and supply shocks based on the level of global economic activity. DOMESTICj,i,t and 
GLOBALj,t are the set of control variables described in Table 3 and in the text. Demandt-1 is the one 
day lagged shock to the demand side of oil, and Supplyt-1 is the one day lagged shock to the supply 
side of oil, both shocks constructed as in Ready (2018). We use the industrial production index to 
differentiate between high and low global economic activities (Hamilton, 2019). High and low global 
economic activities are defined as above and below the industrial economic index’s median. Panel A 
provides results for above median global economic activity and Panel B provide similar analysis for 
below-median global economic activity. The G10 sample includes all countries except for Canada, 
and the major oil-exporting countries’ column includes the following countries: Russia, Iraq, UAE, 
and Kazakhstan. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The sample 
period is from July 2009 to December 2018 for the G10 countries and from February 2011 to 
December 2018 for the oil-exporting countries. 
 
Panel A: Above-Median Global Economic Activity 
  G 10  Exporting Countries 
     
Demandt-1  -0.056  -0.442 
  (0.031)  (0.199) 
Supplyt-1  0.023         -0.286*** 
  (0.020)  (0.047) 
DOMESTICj,i,t  YES  YES 
GLOBALj,t  YES  YES 
 
 
Panel B: Below-Median Global Economic Activity 
  G 10  Exporting Countries 
     
Demandt-1       -0.207***    -1.502** 
  (0.062)  (0.316) 
Supplyt-1       0.046**   0.094 
  (0.019)  (0.103) 
DOMESTICj,i,t  YES  YES 






Table 8: The Effect of Countries’ Oil Dependency on the Relation Between Soverign CDS 
Spreads and Oil Shocks 
 
This table reports estimates for a panel regression model of daily changes in sovereign CDS spreads 
on oil demand and supply shocks based on the country’s reliance on oil imports/revenues. 
DOMESTICj,i,t and GLOBALj,t are the set of control variables described in Table 3 and in the text. 
Demandt-1 is the one day lagged shock to the demand side of oil, and Supplyt-1 is the one day lagged 
shock to the supply side of oil, both shocks constructed as in Ready (2018). For the G10 countries 
(reported in Panel A), we use the ratio of energy imports to total energy domestic use to differentiate 
between high and low imported oil dependency. For the oil-exporting countries (in Panel B), we use 
the ratio of oil rents to GDP to differentiate between high and low oil revenue dependency. The G10 
sample includes all countries except for Canada, and the major oil-exporting countries’ column 
includes the following countries: Russia, Iraq, UAE, and Kazakhstan. ***, **, * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The sample period is from July 2009 to December 2018 for the 
G10 countries and from February 2011 to December 2018 for the oil-exporting countries. 
 
Panel A: G10 Countries 
 
 
Panel B: Oil-Exporting Countries 
 
  Dependence on Oil Imports 
  Above-Median  Below-Median 
     
Demandt-1        -0.188***  -0.150*** 
  (0.030)  (0.014) 
Supplyt-1        0.054**  0.027** 
  (0.022)  (0.011) 
DOMESTICj,i,t  YES  YES 
GLOBALj,t  YES  YES 
  Dependence on Oil Revenues 
  Above-Median  Below-Median 
     
Demandt-1     -0.517*       -1.102*** 
  (0.292)  (0.076) 
Supplyt-1       -0.142**   -0.140 
  (0.068)  (0.095) 
DOMESTICj,i,t  YES  YES 










On June 30, 2015, Greece 
























































































































































































































Figure 2: Sovereign CDS Spread Levels  
This figure graphs the 5-year sovereign CDS spread for the G10 countries (excluding Canada) 
from July 2009 to December 2018 and the 5-year sovereign CDS spread for our sample of oil-
exporting countries (Russia, Iraq, UAE, and Kazakhstan) from February 2011 to December 2018. 





















































































Figure 2 (Continued) 
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